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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I investigate various aspects of international labor migration in dif-
ferent parts of the world.
In the first chapter, I examine how migrants in the United Kingdom adjust their labor
supply in response to exchange rate shocks of their home countries’ currencies. I hypothesize
that migrants from countries which are members of the European Union and the European
Free Trade Agreement would respond differently from those whose countries are outside those
organizations. The former group incurred much lower costs of moving into and out of the UK.
I find that both groups reduce their labor supply in response to a depreciation of their home
currencies (a favorable shock to the migrant), consistent with an income effect dominating a
substitution effect, or income-targeting behavior. However, the EU/EFTA migrants respond
by altering the timing of their return home while the non-EU/EFTA ones adjust their labor
supply inside the UK. This result has implications for long-term consequences of the Brexit
vote and immigration reform in the UK.
The second chapter, coauthored with Adam Chilton, examines the impact of Bilateral
Labor Agreements (BLAs) on migration and remittances. Research on the effects of those
agreements is scarce due to substantial data limitations. In this chapter, we overcome those
constraints by focusing on the Philippines, a particularly prolific signer of BLAs. We identify
68 different BLAs that the Philippines has signed with countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle
East, and North America. We use administrative data on new work contracts and remittance
flows and we do not find any concrete evidence that signing a new BLA has an impact
on either worker deployment or remittances. This is consistent with the fact that BLAs
often have vague and unenforcable provisions, likely to have little effect on the behavior of
xii
governments, firms, or workers.
In the third chapter, I investigate how the heterogeneity of communication skills among
less educated foreign-born individuals in the United States affects U.S.-born workers’ occupa-
tional mobility response to immigration. I build on previous theoretical and empirical work
and develop six different measures of foreign-born communication type, based on language
ability, years since arrival in the U.S., and country of origin. I also construct an instru-
ment which I argue is correlated with both foreign-born shares and communication types.
I confirm the result from previous literature that immigration pushes native-born workers
to specialize in more communication-intensive occupations, but I also find that this effect is
weaker if the foreign-born are more productive in communication tasks. The latter effect is
especially precise when communication type is measured with years since arrival in the U.S.,




Exchange Rate Shocks and Foreign Migrants in the UK
1.1 Introduction
Migrants1, both temporary and permanent, often maintain links to their home countries
for many years after initial migration. They may send remittances to their family members,
save a portion of their earnings to consume or invest in their home country upon returning,
and consume goods imported from their home country. Therefore, macroeconomic shocks in
their home countries should affect their consumption and leisure patterns in the host (des-
tination) country, as well the decision to return home and later remigrate. In this paper, I
explore avenues through which migrants respond to one particular type of macroeconomic
shock: fluctuations of the exchange rates of their home countries’ currencies against the
currency of the host country. A depreciation of the migrant’s home currency against the
destination country’s currency is a favorable shock to the migrant since it raises the value
of remittances and savings repatriated upon returning. The migrant can obtain more con-
sumption in the home country (through higher remittances and savings) per unit of the
destination country’s currency. Two main channels of immigrants’ response to exchange
rate shocks have been identified and empirically studied in the literature: 1) altering the
timing of return home; 2) adjusting labor supply in the home country, e.g. by changing the
1I define as a migrant anyone who was born in a different country from the one they currently reside in.
Therefore, I use the terms migrant, immigrant, and foreign-born interchangably.
1
number of hours worked. However, to my knowledge, no paper has attempted to examine
how those different ways of adjustment may be available to, or preferred by, different groups
of migrants. In particular, migrants who are on work visas or who are in the country il-
legally may find it much more costly to change the timing of their return, either due to a
possibility of apprehension or because visa terms constrain them to a particular duration of
stay. I attempt to bridge this gap in the literature by looking at responses to exchange rate
shocks of foreign-born individuals in the United Kingdom (UK) along two margins: earnings
and hours worked within the UK, and returning to the home country. I compare how those
responses vary between migrants from EU/EFTA2 countries and those from non-EU/EFTA
countries. EU/EFTA migrants in the UK face much lower costs of migration due to geo-
graphic proximity and free movement of labor within the EU (by definition, they cannot be
illegal and they do not need visas to access the UK labor market). Therefore, they should
find it much less costly to respond to shocks in their home countries by adjusting the timing
of their return. On the other hand, non-EU/EFTA migrants are more likely to respond by
adjusting their work effort while remaining in the UK. I examine this hypothesis empirically
by looking at earnings and survey attrition (which proxies for returns home) of the foreign-
born from the UK Labour Force Survey 1997-2017, as well as aggregate estimates of migrant
stocks produced by the UK Office of National Statistics from 2000 to 2017.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways: 1) it explores the re-
lationship between exchange rates and labor supply in the UK, an important immigration
destination; 2) it studies the impact of exchange rate shocks on migrant returns from the UK;
3) it analyzes how migrant heterogeneity affects their responses to economic shocks. The
paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 presents a literature review and background on the
UK immigration system; section 1.3 outlines a theoretical model of migration with different
international mobility costs; section 1.4 describes the data and summary statistics; section
2EU stands for the European Union and includes 27 member countries. EFTA is the European Free Trade
Agreement and includes 4 additional countries. See appendix Table A.1 for a full list of both organizations’
member states.
2
1.5 examines the relationship between exchange rates and earnings of the foreign-born; sec-
tion 1.6 analyzes exchange rates and migrant attrition and stocks; section 1.7 presents some
robustness checks of earnings and returns results; section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature review and background
1.2.1 Migrant remittances and savings
There are several reasons why the exchange rate can affect foreign-born individuals’
labor supply and return decisions in the host country. The ones that have received the
most attention in the literature are remittances and savings. There is abundant evidence
that remittances from overseas migrants are an important source of income to households in
many countries. Remittances may raise consumption and/or investment in Mexico (Massey
and Parrado, 1998; Durand et al., 1996), Pakistan (Adams, 1998), the Philippines (Yang,
2008), Tonga (Brown, 1994; Brown and Ahlburg, 1999), and Samoa (Brown and Ahlburg,
1999). Remittances may also affect other important outcomes, e.g., Edwards and Ureta
(2003) find that remittances substantially reduce the hazard of leaving school in El Salvador,
whereas Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011) show that they raise health expenditures among
Mexican households. In the UK context, the results of a survey conducted among Polish
migrants who returned home, reported by Iglicka (2008), suggest that most of them sent
remittances in order to support consumption of families back home. While data limitations
make it difficult to determine how much of their income migrants remit, Albert and Monras
(2019) estimate that, conditional on remitting at all, immigrants in the United States remit
10 – 15% of their income. The corresponding figures for migrants in Germany, reported by
Sinning (2011), are 11.8 – 18.9%, with 15.6 – 34% of migrants remitting. Dustmann and
Mestres (2010) report an even higher share of migrant households in Germany that remit:
46.2%. Importantly, even though international remittances have been primarily studied in
the context of developing countries, Sinning (2011) shows that migrants from all countries
3
send substantial transfers to their home countries. This is important because many migrants
in the UK are from relatively wealthy European countries.
The other main channel through which exchange rate shocks affect migrants is by chang-
ing the value of their savings accumulated in the destination country and repatriated to the
home country upon returning. For example, Hill (1987), Djajić and Milbourne (1988), and
Dustmann (2003) develop theoretical models where individuals migrate to the destination
country temporarily in order to accumulate savings for consumption in the origin country
after returning. Stark et al. (1997) develop a model of return migration explicitly focused
on the difference in the purchasing power of migration-generated savings between the home
and foreign countries. Foreign-born individuals may also save in the destination country in
order to fund investment projects back home, especially when credit markets in their home
countries are imperfect. Mesnard (2004) demonstrates such a saving motive among Tunisian
migrants, while McCormick and Wahba (2001) show the same for Egyptian ones. Polish
nationals in the UK reported purchasing an apartment in Poland as the most common rea-
son to save (Iglicka, 2008). Immigrants often exhibit sizable saving rates, ranging from 17.4
– 22.4% among migrants in Germany (Sinning, 2011) to 40% among Egyptian ones (Mc-
Cormick and Wahba, 2001), which makes them quite exposed to exchange rate fluctuations
when those savings are repatriated upon return.
1.2.2 Exchange rates and migrant labor supply
The literature on the effect of exchange rate shocks on migrants’ labor supply on the
intensive margin (e.g., hours worked or effort) in the destination country is quite limited.
The earliest attempt to explore this topic was made by Fox and Stark (1987). They use data
from a survey of Mexican migrants in the United States to show that favorable exchange
rate shocks (i.e., depreciation of the peso) are correlated with more hours worked by the
migrants. More recent work by Nekoei (2013) uses data from the U.S. Current Population
Survey 1994 – 2011 to examine the relationship between exchange rate fluctuations and
4
labor market outcomes of the foreign-born. He finds that depreciation of migrants’ home
currencies is associated with a decrease in USD-denominated earnings, with an elasticity of
annual earnings with respect to the real exchange rate (home currency divided by USD)
equal to approximately −0.092. About 60% of that effect is explained by a decrease in
annual hours worked, of which two-thirds stems from a decline in annual weeks worked and
the rest from a decline in hours per week. Nguyen and Duncan (2017) obtain roughly similar
results from analyzing immigrants in Australia, although their elasticities of earnings and
hours worked w.r.t. to the real exchange rate are attenuated somewhat when they control
for individual fixed effects. They also show a significant gender gap in migrants’ response to
exchange rate shocks, with males generally reducing their earnings more than females for a
given change in the exchange rate. Finally, Bello (2020) focuses on cross-border commuters
from Italy to Switzerland and finds that appreciation of the Swiss franc is correlated with
higher commuter traffic between the two countries, as well as a spike in Google searches
for job offers in Switzerland originating from a border region in Italy. In addition, she uses
survey data to show that a stronger Swiss franc is associated with more hours worked by
cross-border workers.
Several authors have used microdata to examine the impact of exchange rate shocks on
the decision by migrants to return home. Yang (2006) exploits the variation in exchange rate
shocks experienced by Filipino migrants in different destination countries during the 1997
Asian financial crisis and estimates that a 10% depreciation of the Philippine peso leads
to a decline in the return rate by 1.4 percentage points. This result implies that migrants
remained in the destination countries longer in order to take advantage of favorable exchange
rate fluctuations. However, migrants from the middle of the earnings distribution were
least affected, suggesting income-targeting behavior in that subsample. Abarcar (2017) also
examines the Asian financial crisis and finds that a 10% depreciation of the migrant’s home
country currency leads to a 10% lower probability of returning home within two years among
the foreign-born in Australia. Finally, using data on immigrants from four countries who
5
reside in Germany, Kirdar (2009) shows that a depreciation of the home country’s currency
reduces return rates among young migrants but increases it among older migrants who are
closer to retirement.
The relationship between exchange rates and migration can also be studied with aggregate
data. Both Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) and Davila (1983) observe that apprehensions
of Mexican migrants illegally crossing the border into the U.S. spike after devaluations of
the Mexican peso. Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011) look at migration flows from 66 countries
into various OECD destinations and note that depreciation of origin country currencies is
associated with higher emigration rates from those countries. Keita (2016) uses a larger
set of 165 origin countries to show that a 10% depreciation of the migrant’s home country
currency is associated with an increase in migrant inflows of 18.2 – 19.4%.
Most evidence on the effect of exchange rates on migrants specifically in the UK is
speculative or anecdotal. For example, Pollard et al. (2008) predicted that as the pound
sterling lost value against currencies of the new EU member states which had joined in 2004,
migrants from those countries would be less likely to migrate into the UK and more likely
to return home. Similar opinions were expressed in the following article from 20083:
“A survey by Britain’s largest Polish-speaking radio station at the end of last
year reported that almost 40 per cent of migrant Polish workers would seriously
consider returning home if the exchange rate fell to four zlotys to the pound.”
Additional evidence that migrants are concerned about exchange rates comes from Google
searches. In appendix Figure A.1, I show the volume of searches from inside the UK for
the Polish phrase “kurs walut”, meaning “exchange rates,” between 2004 and 2017. There
is a spike from mid-2007 till early 2009, corresponding to a period during which the UK
pound severely depreciated against the Polish zloty. There is a second peak in mid-2016,
following the unexpected success of the Brexit campaign, which led to depreciation of the
3Taylor, Andrew. “Weak pound has Poles eyeing homeland.” Financial Times, May 25, 2008. Ac-
cessed November 1st, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/593a9752-2a97-11dd-b40b-000077b07658 . Found
through Mishra and Spilimbergo (2011).
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pound, too. However, while this data is suggestive that the foreign-born pay close attention
to movements in exchange rates, it does not tell us anything about how those movements
affect their labor supply and return plans.
1.2.3 International mobility costs
Various costs borne by international migrants have been recognized since the early days
of economic analysis of migration (Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970). However,
relatively little attention has been devoted to the costs that the migrant might incur once
he or she is already in the country of destination. To the extent that such costs have been
studied, it has been primarily in the context of illegal migration. For example, Massey et al.
(2016) argue that the rapidly rising U.S.-Mexico border enforcement has had a perverse effect
of increasing the undocumented population living inside the United States, as migrants fear
that they will not be able re-enter the country if they leave.
1.2.4 Background on free movement of labor within the UK
Most foreign-born individuals who wish to work in the United Kingdom legally must
apply for a visa.4 The application process varies depending on the type of work the migrant
performs. Foreign-born individuals in “skilled” occupations require a licensed sponsor, must
pay fees potentially exceeding 1000 GBP, and may not remain in the visa status for more
than 6 years. There are also short-term visas for farm and domestic workers which are valid
for up to 6 months. Some visa categories may allow migrants to apply for permanent status,
but only after they have fulfilled certain requirements, such as continuous residency in the
UK and satisfactory knowledge of English.
In contrast, those legal constraints did not apply to migrants from countries which are
members of the European Union (EU) or the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Free
4Following its departure from the European Union in 2020, the UK introduced a new points-based
immigration system. However, the system outlined in this section applied throughout the period
of my analysis. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/new-immigration-system-what-you-need-to-know and
https://www.gov.uk/browse/visas-immigration/work-visas, accessed October 31st, 2020.
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movement of labor is one of the foundational principles of the EU and it is extended to the
EFTA. As a member of the EU until its departure in January 2020, the UK had to abide by
that principle and allow labor market access to EU/EFTA migrants under the same terms as
UK nationals, although some caveats applied to migrants from new EU members in Eastern
Europe, which joined in 2004 or later. When 10 new countries joined the EU in May 2004,
almost all other EU members imposed temporary restrictions on movement of labor from
those countries. However, the UK was one of a handful of old EU members that allowed
complete and unrestricted labor market access to migrants from the new countries. The only
requirement was that workers from those countries registered with the Worker Registration
Scheme when they first began employment in the UK (Pollard et al., 2008). The registration
fee was 50 GBP, later raised to 90 GBP. Workers were no longer required to register once
they had completed 12 months of continuous employment in the UK. Many migrants did
not register at all, as they did not need proof of registration to begin employment and there
were no serious penalties for failing to register. The scheme was discontinued in 2011.
More stringent restrictions were imposed until 2014 on migrants from Romania and Bul-
garia when those countries joined the EU in 2007. Individuals from those countries were
initially subject to similar rules as non-EU/EFTA migrants. However, starting in 2008, par-
ticipation in low-skilled migration schemes were limited to immigrants from Romania and
Bulgaria, giving them a large advantage over non-EU/EFTA migrants (Pollard et al., 2008).
Also importantly, workers from those countries gained unrestricted access to UK labor mar-
kets after 12 months of legal employment. Finally, Romanians and Bulgarians who were
classified as self-employed were not subject to any restrictions. For all those reasons, I count
Romanian and Bulgarian foreign-born in the EU/EFTA category beginning in 2007, i.e. the
year their countries joined the EU. I do the same with Croatian migrants, who were subject
to similar restrictions and who became EU members in 2013. Nonetheless, as a robustness
check, I perform all my analysis with an alternative classification of immigrants from those
three countries, described in section 1.4.5.
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1.2.5 Migration flows in the UK
The UK has been an important destination country for international migrants for the past
25 years. Net migration in the UK was close to zero in 1993 but it rapidly rose to 163,000 in
1999 and then above 200,000 after the 2004 EU expansion, reaching a peak of 331,000 in 2015
(Sumption and Vargas-Silva, 2020). The composition of international migrant inflows has
also changed over this time period. Until 2004, fewer than 20% of immigrants came from
other EU countries but their share increased to about 35% by 2008 (Vargas-Silva, 2013).
Many migrants, both from the EU and outside of it, are temporary. For example, based on
visa data, between 2016 and 2017, 42,000 non-EU migrants came to the UK to work while
30,000 work visa holders left (Office for National Statistics, 2018). It is difficult to produce
equivalent figures for EU migrants due to their lack of visa requirements. However, in 2019,
an estimated 195,000 EU migrants moved to the UK for any reason and 137,000 moved out
(Office for National Statistics, 2020). Pollard et al. (2008) estimate that between 2004 and
2007, 1 million migrants from the new EU countries came to the UK but half of them left
permanently by the end of 2007. EU migrants tend to be much more flexible about their
intended duration of stay in the UK than non-EU ones. Nearly half of immigrants from
the EU do not know how long they will remain in the UK – the corresponding number for
non-EU ones is only 11% (Office for National Statistics, 2019).
In addition, it has been increasingly recognized that many immigrants are “circular”,
i.e., they move back and forth between the UK and their countries of origin. For example,
among those non-EU migrants who have a work, study, or family visa valid for 4 years or
more, the average number of trips to the UK is 8.7 and the average trip duration is 115.6
days (Office for National Statistics, 2018). Pollard et al. (2008) argue that circular migration
is especially likely for EU migrants:
“(...) in contrast to previous migrants, it is financially and logistically possible
for migrants from the new EU member states to come to the UK on a temporary
or seasonal basis, and to regularly visit home while living in Britain. One in ten
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of those returned Poles in the survey had been in the UK for three months or
longer on more than one occasion in recent years.”
According to a survey of Polish immigrants conducted by Pollard et al. (2008), 18% said
they only came to work seasonally (another 16% said they always intended to return once
they saved a certain amount of money). A separate 2006 University of Surrey survey of
500 Poles in the UK found that 22% of them identified as seasonal migrants (Pollard et al.,
2008). In an ethnographic study of Polish migrants in London, Eade (2007) finds that 20%
of interviewees moved back and forth between the UK and Poland, e.g. a man who comes
to London for 3-5 months each year and spends the remaining months working on his farm
back home. In my own sample of foreign-born workers in the Labour Force Survey, described
in section 1.4.1, 7.8% of EU migrants and 6.9% of non-EU ones have not lived in the UK
continuously. For those individuals, the mean difference between their first and most recent
arrivals in the UK is 11.2 years, suggesting that circular migration may persist for a long
time.
1.3 Theory
In the previous section, I argued that exchange rates are related to labor supply and
return decisions of the foreign-born through their impact on remittances and savings. The
exact nature of this relationship could be illustrated with a life-cycle model of consumption
and leisure, where the migrant consumes a portion of her foreign income in the home country
(Nekoei, 2013). In such a model, a depreciation of the migrant’s home currency triggers a
substitution effect away from leisure as its price rises in terms of the home currency, and an
income effect towards leisure, since the migrant’s earnings are worth more in terms the home
currency. The net impact on hours and work effort depends on the relative magnitudes
of those effects. In addition, if the migrant prefers consumption in her home country to
that in the destination country, as is generally assumed in models of return migration (Hill,
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1987; Stark et al., 1997; Dustmann, 2003), the income effect pushes the migrant to return
home sooner while the substitution effect pulls her in the opposite direction. Such life-cycle
models can be modified to explain income-targeting behavior, for example, by assuming
that migrants need a certain amount of investment capital for a project back home but are
credit-constrained (Mesnard, 2004; Yang, 2006).
The main contribution of this paper is to show that different types of migrants may
have access to different channels of adjustment to exchange rate shocks, depending on the
international mobility costs that they face. In order to guide intuition, I outline a simple
dynamic model of repeat, or circular, migration (i.e. where the foreign-born individual may
choose to migrate and return home more than once during her lifetime), based on Dustmann
and Görlach (2016). Consider a migrant from country i with characteristics Xt residing in
the UK in the current period t. Xt should be thought of as a vector of variables which affect
the migrant’s labor supply outcomes, such as age, education, language ability, etc. In each
period, the migrant decides whether to continue living in the UK for at least one more period
or return to her home country i. Given Xt, she obtains value VUK(Xt) if she chooses to stay
in the UK and Vi(Xt) if she chooses to return. Thus, the migrant obtains
V (Xt) = max{VUK(Xt), Vi(Xt)}
VUK(Xt) = max
YUK,t
u(πUK , YUK,t) + βV (Xt+1) = u(πUK , Y
∗
UK,t) + βV (Xt+1)
Vi(Xt) = max
Yi,t
u(πi, Yi,t) + βV (Xt+1) = u(πi, Y
∗
i,t) + βV (Xt+1)
where Y ∗L,t is an optimally chosen vector of variables that affect the migrant’s utility, L ∈
{UK, i}, and β is a discount factor. The variables in Y ∗L,t include the migrant’s own con-
sumption of commodities and leisure but may also include the consumption obtained by her




πi > πUK , i.e. the migrant prefers consumption in her own country to that in the UK.
Consider an exchange rate shock experienced by the migrant. Specifically, suppose that
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the UK pound appreciates against the migrant’s country’s currency (conversely, the home
currency depreciates). Also, suppose that the migrant’s pre-shock optimal choice was to
remain in the UK and consume Y ∗UK,t. She can respond to the shock either by altering her
location decision or by remaining in the UK while changing her choice from Y ∗UK,t to Ỹ
∗
UK,t.
In particular, if the migrant is a target earner or the income effect dominates the substitution
effect, she may either choose to return to her home country sooner or remain in the UK but
work less. She will choose the former if ṼUK(Xt) < Ṽi(Xt) and the latter if ṼUK(Xt) > Ṽi(Xt)
(the tilde symbol refers to the post-shock value).
Now suppose that the migrant faces costs to adjusting the return decision. Specifically,
a foreign-born individual must incur cost C(i) in order to enter the UK, so that
V (Xt) = max{VUK(Xt)− C(i), Vi(Xt)}
This cost may entail having to apply for a visa or, in the case of illegal migrants, having to
pay smuggling fees and risking detection and deportation. In addition, as discussed above,
certain visa categories may have a continuous residency requirement if the migrant wishes
to obtain permanent status. A forward-looking migrant who expects to return to the UK s
periods in the future would change her return decision relative to what it would be in the
absence of C(i), if Vi(Xt) > VUK(Xt) > Vi(Xt)− βsC(i). In other words, the migrant would
like to return home in response to the exchange rate shock, but because she knows that
returning in the future is costly, she instead chooses to remain in the UK and respond by
adjusting her consumption and labor supply.
Another type of international mobility cost stems from overstaying a visa that allows
a foreign-born individual to work in the UK. Suppose that in each period following the
expiration of her visa, the migrant incurs a cost K(i) if she continues to stay in the UK, so
that
V (Xt) = max{VUK(Xt)−K(i), Vi(Xt)}
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This cost arises because the migrant has to expend effort to avoid detection, she may be
prevented from obtaining certain social benefits, or she may be unable to enter the UK
legally in the future if detected. In this case, a migrant who would like to remain in the
UK longer in response to an exchange rate shock may nonetheless return home if staying
for additional periods would cause her to overstay her visa. Mathematically, VUK(Xt) >
Vi(Xt) > VUK(Xt)−K(i).
Thus, international mobility costs lead migrants to stay in the UK longer or shorter
than would be optimal when faced with an exchange rate shock. Instead of responding
by adjusting their duration of stay in the UK, foreign-born who have to bear such costs
will respond by altering their consumption and labor supply while remaining in the UK.
Importantly, both types of costs depend on the migrant’s home country i. Due to various
international agreements, immigrants from some countries face much lower costs of entering
the UK or staying in the country longer than originally planned. Specifically, migrants from
countries which are members of the European Union or the European Free Trade Agreement
enjoyed complete and unconstrained access to the UK labor market until 31 January 20205,
so that C(i) ≈ K(i) ≈ 0. Thus, relative to non-EU/EFTA migrants, we would expect
EU/EFTA ones to be more likely to alter the timing of their departure from the UK and
less likely to change their labor supply within the UK in response to exchange rate shocks.
1.4 Data and summary statistics
1.4.1 Labour Force Survey
My primary source of data is the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS), from the
first quarter of 1997 to the second quarter of 2017. The LFS is a survey of a random sample
of households residing in the United Kingdom, conducted since 1973. Under the current
design, which was implemented in 1992, each household is interviewed five times, at exactly
5Following its Brexit vote in 2016, the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. However, free labor movement
for EU/EFTA migrants applied throughout my sample period.
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3-month intervals, so that the fifth interview (wave 5) takes place exactly 1 year after the
first one (wave 1). After wave 5, the household is rotated out of the survey. In 2016, slightly
over 70,000 households were in the sample. However, the non-response rate is quite high and
has increased over time, from about 25% in wave 1 in the first quarter of 2003 to 45% in
wave 1 in the first quarter of 2017 (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Central
Survey Unit, Office for National Statistics, Social Survey Division, 2020). Moreover, there
is non-trivial attrition within any LFS cohort. For example, out of the 8,335 responding
households in wave 1 in the first quarter of 2016, only 5,372 responded in wave 5 a year
later, implying an attrition rate of 35.5% (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,
Central Survey Unit, Office for National Statistics, Social Survey Division, 2020).
The LFS contains questions about each household member’s labor force status and char-
acteristics, such as hours worked, occupation, industry, etc. Most questions refer to the
reference week, which is the full week (Monday to Sunday) preceding the date of the inter-
view. Not all questions are asked in each wave, e.g. earnings, which is my main outcome of
interest, are only asked about in waves 1 and 5. In addition to labor force variables, basic de-
mographic characteristics of each household member are recorded. Household members who
were born outside the UK are asked their country of birth and the year they first came to the
UK. Importantly, the survey can be conducted in a number of foreign languages if the initial
interviewer determines that the respondent does not have sufficient English proficiency.
There are some important limitations of the LFS when it comes to studying migrants. It
is thought to undercount immigrants who have recently arrived or who stay in the UK for a
relatively short time (Clark and Drinkwater, 2008). In addition, migrants have a relatively
high propensity to live in group quarters, which are not covered by the LFS (Pollard et al.,
2008). Nevertheless, the survey is the most comprehensive source of microdata on the foreign-
born in the UK and has been used to study return migration (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007),
labor market performance of recent migrants (Clark and Drinkwater, 2008), and the fiscal
consequences of immigration from new EU member states (Dustmann et al., 2010).
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1.4.2 Aggregate migrant stock data
In addition to the LFS microdata, I use annual estimates of aggregate migrant stocks
in the UK, by country of birth, published by the UK Office for National Statistics. Those
estimates are obtained from the Annual Population Survey (APS) which is composed of the
LFS and a number of boost samples. Note that these estimates include all foreign-born
individuals, regardless of age and labor force status. In addition, values for countries with
relatively small populations living in the UK are estimated with sizable standard errors. I
use those estimates for years 2000 – 2017 (data for years prior to 2000 are not available).
1.4.3 Exchange rate data
I obtain data on nominal exchange rates and consumer price indices at monthly and
annual frequencies from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database maintained by
the IMF. A unique challenge is presented by countries which adopt the euro as their national
currency during the sample period.6 In order to deal with this problem, I follow the approach
of Feenstra et al. (2015) and convert those countries’ pre-euro national currencies to the euro
at the fixed conversion rate that prevailed at the time they joined the eurozone.7
1.4.4 Other country-level data
Finally, I use data on a number of time-varying characteristics of migrants’ home coun-
tries:
1. real GDP per capita, obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database.
6These include, in 2001 – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain; in 2001 – Greece; in 2007 – Slovenia; in 2008 – Cyprus,
Malta; in 2009 – Slovakia; in 2011 – Estonia; in 2014 – Latvia; in 2015 – Lithuania. See
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/index.en.html (accessed November 2nd, 2020).
7See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/index.en.html (accessed November 2nd, 2020) for a list
of the conversion rates.
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2. total trade flows from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics database, supplemented
with estimates from the Correlates of War Trade Data Set, Version 4.0 (Barbieri et al.,
2009; Barbieri and Keshk, 2016).
3. polity2 scores produced by the Center for Systemic Peace. Polity2 scores measure how
democratic a country is on a scale from -10 to 10, with higher values indicating a more
democratic system and lower values indicating a more autocratic one.
4. numbers of people killed and otherwise affected by natural and technological disasters
from the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT).
5. numbers of deaths in organized violence, from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(Pettersson and Öberg, 2020; Sundberg and Melander, 2013). Organized violence is
defined as wars between sovereign states, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence
towards particular groups (e.g., based on ethnicity).
All these variables are measured at an annual level.
1.4.5 Summary statistics
In my primary analysis, I use data from the LFS starting in quarter 1 of 1997 and
ending in quarter 2 of 2017. I only look at data from wave 1 households in each quarter
in order to avoid double counting. I include individuals born outside the United Kingdom
who are employees (the LFS does not report the earnings of the self-employed), are not
full-time students, and who report positive gross weekly earnings. In addition, I only include
individuals who worked at all in the reference week, as those who are employed but did not
work in the reference week may be temporarily detached from the labor force (e.g. because
they are on sick leave). Table 1.1 presents summary statistics from this sample, separately
for migrants from EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA countries. A person is only classified as an
EU/EFTA migrant after his or her country joins one of those organizations. For instance, a
person born in Latvia is only an EU/EFTA migrant if he or she is interviewed in May 2004
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or later, i.e. after Latvia becomes and EU member. I take the same approach with migrants
from Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, and Croatia which joined in
2013. However, for reasons described in section 1.2.4, I perform a robustness check where
I reclassify Romanians and Bulgarians as EU/EFTA immigrants starting only in 2014, and
Croatians as non-EU/EFTA in my entire sample period.
The sample includes 48,417 individuals, out of whom 39.5% are from EU/EFTA countries.
On average, EU/EFTA migrants are slightly younger and have been in the UK for a shorter
time than non-EU/EFTA ones. They are significantly less likely to be married8 and slightly
more likely to be less educated.9 The distribution of employment across major sectors is
similar for the two groups, although a larger share of EU/EFTA migrants are employed in
manufacturing and a smaller share in health and social work.10 Panel C of Table 1.1 shows
that average gross weekly earnings of EU/EFTA migrants are slightly lower than those of
non-EU/EFTA ones, even though the former tend to work more hours, both regular and
overtime. Finally, Panel B demonstrates that EU/EFTA countries are, on average, more
prosperous, democratic, and peaceful than non-EU/EFTA countries, at least among those
whose nationals work in the United Kingdom. In appendix table A.2, I list the countries with
the most migrants in the UK in my sample. Nearly 11% of the sample consists of individuals
born in India, 8.9% in Poland, 7.3% in Ireland, and 5.9% in Germany. No other country
contributes more than 5% of the sample. Overall, migrants from 156 different countries are
included.
In order to construct my measure of real exchange rates, I multiply monthly nominal
exchange rates (units of the home country currency per pound) by the ratio of monthly
8I classify individuals who are separated as married.
9Prior to 2011, most educational qualifications obtained outside the UK were not coded in the LFS.
Because of this, foreign-born individuals’ education would usually be classified as “other,” regardless of
their actual degrees obtained. Therefore, I use the question on age at which the person completed full-time
education and classify as less educated those who left full-time schooling at 18 or younger.
10The “Other” category includes: agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining; electricity, gas, and
water supply; construction; financial intermediation; public administration and defense; other community,
social, and personal; private households with employed persons; extra-territorial organizations. In all my
regressions, I control for each of those categories separately.
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price levels (measured by the CPI). That is, the real exchange rate that a migrant from
country i faces in month t is: realEXi,t = nomEXi,t × CPIUK,tCPIi,t . Therefore, an increase in
the real exchange rate, i.e. a depreciation of the migrant’s home currency (an appreciation
of the pound) should be considered a favorable shock to the migrant, as it allows her to
afford more consumption or investment in the home country for any given earnings in the
UK. In the bottom panel of Figure 1.1, I plot the real exchange of currencies of several
countries with some of the largest migrant populations in the UK as of 2017. For this figure,
I convert real exchange rates to an index whose value is equal to 100 in January 1997 for all
countries. In addition, the top panel shows the real effective exchange rate of the pound, i.e.
an exchange rate index of the pound against all other countries’ currencies, weighted by the
volumes of trade between the UK and each country. Figure 1.1 demonstrates two facts: 1)
there is substantial variation in exchange rates, both across countries and within countries
over time; 2) there was a large decline in the value of the pound between July 2007 and
January 2009 but it was not uniform across the different countries.
1.5 Exchange rate shocks and earnings
In this section, I analyze the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on earnings of the
foreign-born. I begin in section 1.5.1 by looking at the full sample, in order to establish a
baseline result and compare my results to other authors’. Then, in section 1.5.2, I compare
the responses of EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA migrants.
1.5.1 All migrants
Using my sample of foreign-born employees, described in section 1.4.5, I test whether
migrants adjust their earnings in response to exchange rate shocks. Specifically, I run the
following regression:
ln(Yj,i,t) = β0 + βEX ln(realEXi,t) + βXXj,i,t + βZZi,t + γi + δt + εj,i,t (1.1)
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where Yj,i,t are the gross weekly earnings of migrant j from country i in month t; realEXi,t
is the real exchange rate that the migrant faces, as defined in section 1.4.5; Xj,i,t are migrant-
specific characteristics which may be time-varying; Zi,t is a vector of time-varying character-
istics of the migrant’s home country; γi is a home country fixed effect; and δt is a month ×
year fixed effect (e.g. March 2001, September 2014, etc.). Thus, the coefficient βEX identifies
the elasticity of the migrant’s earnings with respect to the real exchange rate. I cluster the
standard errors at the country, month × year, and industry of employment level, following
the approach developed by Correia (2016). The results of this regression are presented in ta-
ble 1.211. Column (1) presents a model only with the exchange rate, and country and month
× year dummies and shows a negative exchange rate elasticity of earnings which is significant
at the 10% level. In column (2), I add the migrant’s demographic characteristics12. In order
to control for aspects of labor demand that may not be fully captured by month × dummies,
in model (3), I also introduce dummies for the individual’s major sector of employment. It
is important to control for the migrant’s industry as certain sectors may be more exposed to
exchange rate fluctuations than others (Campa and Goldberg, 2001). It is also possible that
exchange rate shocks are correlated with other events in the foreign-born’s home countries
which also affect their earnings through remittance commitments or savings targets. Hence,
in column (4), I add various time-varying country-level controls. The coefficient on exchange
rates remains negative and statistically significant in models (2) – (4), although the sample
size is much lower in model (4) as a result of missing observations. This coefficient implies
that a 10% depreciation of the migrant’s home currency (a favorable shock, as discussed pre-
viously) leads her to reduce her earnings by 0.79 – 0.85%. Migrants in my sample have mean
11In these regressions, as well as all the other regressions reported in the main paper, I choose not to use
person weights from the LFS. Those weights do not take into account the individual’s country of birth and
the foreign-born in the UK are quite different demographically from the UK natives. However, including
weights does not change the results substantively. Weighted regressions are reported in the appendix. The
version of table 1.2 with LFS weights is Table A.3.
12Also of note is the positive and statistically significant coefficient on years since arrival, suggesting that
migrants become better integrated with the UK labor market as they spend time in it, with a 0.7 – 0.8%
increase in earnings per year spent in the UK. There is a large literature on whether migrants’ earnings catch
up with natives’ over time, e.g. Borjas (1985) and Adsera and Chiswick (2007).
19
weekly earnings of 464 pounds (in 2010 GBP) with a standard deviation of 453. Thus, a 10%
depreciation would lead them to reduce their earnings by about 4 pounds, on average. The
negative coefficient on the exchange rate suggests either that the income effect dominates the
substitution effect in the context of a neoclassical model of labor supply, or that migrants
have income targets, for example due to remittance commitments. It is also worth noting
that my estimate is very close to the elasticities reported in Nekoei (2013) and Nguyen and
Duncan (2017), who run similar regressions using U.S. and Australian data, respectively.
1.5.2 EU/EFTA vs. non-EU/EFTA migrants
In this section, I test whether EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA migrants respond differently
to exchange rate shocks. I begin by plotting log weekly earnings against log exchange rates
(after controlling for country and month× year dummies and removing the mean), separately
for those two types of migrants, in Figure 1.213. The right-hand panel, which includes non-
EU/EFTA foreign-born, shows a negative relationship, similar to the combined sample in
section 1.5.1. However, the opposite is true for EU/EFTA migrants, suggesting that they
may actually increase their earnings in response to a depreciation of their home currencies.
I present those results more formally in Table 1.3, which shows the results of the same
regression as in Equation 1.1 and Table 1.2, estimated separately for the two groups of mi-
grants14. The row labeled “Ln(real exrate) difference” contains the difference between the
coefficients on the exchange rate and its standard error. The table shows that the exchange
rate elasticity of earnings is estimated more precisely for the non-EU/EFTA migrants than
the EU/EFTA ones and it is larger in absolute value, although the difference is not statis-
13The figure is created by residualizing log weekly earnings and log exchange rates on country and month
× year dummies, dividing the resulting exchange rate residuals into 20 equally sized bins, and calculating
mean log exchange rates and log weekly earnings in each bin.
14Specifically, the regression is estimated by fully interacting all covariates with a dummy for EU/EFTA.
Mechanically, this produces identical point estimates of coefficients to running the regression for the two
groups separately. However, standard errors may vary slightly between these two approaches, due to different
overall sample sizes and degrees of freedom. The results of running the regressions separately for the two
groups are not reported, but they are virtually indistinguishable from Table 1.3 and are available from the
author upon request.
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tically significant, mainly due to the wide confidence interval of the EU/EFTA estimate.
These results suggest that non-EU/EFTA migrants are more likely to alter their earnings
in response to exchange rate shocks than EU/EFTA ones and that the magnitude of that
response may be larger (although note that the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient for
the EU/EFTA group contains relatively large responses in both directions)15.
The regressions in Table 1.3 do not tell us anything about how migrants adjust their
earnings. I attempt to shed some light on this question by running the same regression
as in Table 1.3 but with different labor market outcomes, presented in Table 1.4. For each
dependent variable, I report the coefficient on the exchange rate for the EU/EFTA migrants,
non-EU/EFTA migrants, and the difference between the two. For the sake of parsimony,
I only include models (3) and (4) from Table 1.3. However, the results of models (1) and
(2) are not substantively different and are available upon request. Table 1.4 shows that in
response to a depreciation of their home currencies, non-EU/EFTA migrants respond by
reducing hours worked, both regular and overtime. Meanwhile, EU/EFTA migrants may
actually increase their hours, although the coefficients are not statistically significant. Both
groups might also be less likely to look for a new or additional job. Other potential margins
of adjustment, which I do not investigate, include working different shifts, changing firms
within the same industry (de Matos, 2017a), or altering the amount of effort16.
1.6 Exchange rate shocks and migrant returns
In this section, I examine whether exchange rate shocks have differential effects on mi-
grants’ decisions to return to their home countries, depending on their country’s membership
in the EU/EFTA. Based on the theory outlined in section 1.3, I hypothesize that EU/EFTA
foreign-born are more likely to respond to exchange rate shocks by adjusting the timing of
15Estimating the regressions with LFS person weights (appendix Table A.4) or with an alternative classi-
fication of Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia (appendix Table A.7) generates very similar results.
16See appendix Table A.5 and Table A.8 for specifications with weights and alternative definitions of EU
membership, respectively.
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their return home because their costs of doing so are much lower. I measure migrant returns
in three ways: 1) individual attrition from the LFS between waves 1 and 5; 2) aggregate
attrition from the LFS, by cohort; 3) changes in the aggregate stock of migrants in the UK.
1.6.1 Migrant returns - individual attrition
I measure migrant returns with attrition from the LFS between the migrant’s first and
final waves. In order to evaluate the validity of this approach, I conduct two tests. First,
I compare survey attrition among the foreign-born to that of natives: we would expect the
former to be meaningfully higher than the latter if part of migrants’ attrition is due to
emigration. For each LFS quarter, I count the number of all foreign-born who meet my
sample criterita (employees, not students, worked in the reference week) and are in their
first LFS wave. I then count how many such individuals are in their fifth wave one year
later. I perform the same analysis for UK-born natives. The implied attrition rates for the
two groups are plotted in Figure 1.3. Attrition is higher for immigrants than natives in most
quarters, sometimes substantially so, consistent with the idea that at least some migrants
drop out of the LFS because they return to their home countries. Throughout the sample
period, the mean attrition rate for the foreign-born is 17.2%, compared to 13.5% for natives.
Assuming that the only difference between natives’ and immigrants’ attrition rates stems
from migrants’ returning home, this would imply an annual return rate of 3.7%, broadly in
line with migrant return rates estimated in the literature (Dustmann, 2003; Yang, 2006).
Clearly, LFS attrition is a noisy measure of emigration. One concern is that a portion of
the attrition rate that is not due to migrant returns is correlated with exchange rates for some
reason. Therefore, I also check whether survey attrition among natives is correlated with
effective exchange rates of the pound. In Figure 1.4, I plot both variables over time, with
attrition on the left y-axis and effective exchange rates on the right y-axis. At first glance, it
may seem that those two series are negatively correlated. However, upon closer inspection, it
is clear that while attrition rises over time, the effective exchange rate is relatively stable until
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2007 when it suddenly collapses to a much lower level and remains stable before picking up
somewhat in 2014. The exchange rate collapse in 2007 is not accompanied by a meaningful
increase in survey attrition among natives. Conversely, the increase in attrition between
2001 and 2004 does not seem to be matched by changes in the exchange rates. Likewise,
the decline in attrition between 2010 and 2012 appears uncorrelated with any changes in the
exchange rates. Therefore, I am reasonably confident that the portion of survey attrition
due to factors other than emigration of the foreign-born is uncorrelated with exchange rates.
Unfortunately, the version of the LFS accessible to researchers outside the UK is limited in
that it is more difficult to follow individuals across their 5 survey waves. Therefore, I match
individuals between waves 1 and 5 based on a number of survey variables and individual
characteristics. Prior to the second quarter of 2001, the data contained system variables
which made it possible to follow households over time. However, it was not possible to
definitively follow individuals within those households because person identifiers within the
household could change if its composition changed. Therefore, I first link households between
waves 1 and 5 using the system variables and then link individuals within the households
using their age, sex, country of birth, and year of first arrival in the UK, i.e., variables which
should remain constant over time.
Starting in the third quarter of 2001, some of the system variables used to follow house-
holds over time were removed and it is no longer possible to use them to match households
across waves with certainty. Therefore, I link individuals between waves 1 and 5 using the
remaining system variables and the four demographic characteristics mentioned above. In
cases where I cannot create unambiguous matches, I then use age at which the person com-
pleted full-time education and person number within the household. Using this method, I am
able to match 99.5% of my sample17. As a test of the robustness of my matching algorithm,
I apply my post-2001 method to the pre-2001 data and compare the resulting matches to
those created with the (more reliable) pre-2001 method. The two methods generate identical
17Note that I also cannot match anyone after quarter 2 of 2016, as my sample ends in quarter 2 of 2017
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matches except in one case. Thus, I am resonably confident that my matches are accurate.
Nevertheless, it is possible that there is some measurement error, i.e. I classify some migrants
as leaving before wave 5 and vice versa.
Using the method outline above, I create a variable equal to 0 if I can match a migrant
between waves 1 and 5 and 1 if I only observe them in wave 1 but not wave 5. I then regress
this survey attrition variable on exchange rates and the same set of covariates as in Table 1.3,
separately for EU and non-EU migrants. My exchange rate measure, however, is different
from the contemporaneous real exchange rate used in section 1.5. I only know whether the
person left the survey within 12 months after their wave 1 interview but I cannot pinpoint
the exact month of their departure. Therefore, I use an average real exchange rate over
the 12 months following the month of the interview. The results, in Table 1.5, demonstrate
that for EU/EFTA migrants, the probability of leaving the survey increases as a result of
their home currency’s depreciation. For example, the coefficient in model (4) implies that
a 10% depreciation raises the probability of survey attrition by 4.7 percentage points. This
is a sizable effect, equal to over 10% of the mean attrition rate in the EU/EFTA subsample
of 45.1%18. While there may be reasons for survey attrition other than migrant returns,
the fact that the coefficient for non-EU/EFTA migrants is a fairly precisely estimated zero
suggests that most of the effect does indeed stem from migrants’ going home in response to
favorable exchange rate shocks and extending their stay in the UK in response to unfavorable
ones. Note also that the unconditional means of individual attrition rates, reported at the
bottom of Table 1.5, are very similar across the two groups. Taken together with the results
from section 1.5.2, the results in Table 1.5 suggest both EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA
migrants respond to favorable exchange rate shocks by reducing their labor supply in the
UK, implying either that the income effect dominates the substitution effect or that they
have income targets. However, the non-EU/EFTA foreign-born respond on the intensive
margin – by altering their labor supply within the UK, while EU/EFTA ones respond on
18The results are robust to the inclusion of individual weights (appendix Table A.6) and an alternative
classification of Bulgarian, Romanian, and Croatian migrants (appendix Table A.9).
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the extensive margin – by adjusting the timing of their return home.
1.6.2 Migrant returns - stocks by cohort from the LFS
As a further robustness check of my individual attrition results, I check if exchange rates
affect aggregate migrant attrition from the LFS. Here, I no longer rely on my matching
algorithm and instead create aggregate stocks of migrants in the LFS, by country of origin,
year, and arrival cohort. That is, I count the number of people from each country and
arrival cohort (starting with the 1996 cohort) in my sample still present in the data in
the years that follow. Each observation in the resulting dataset is at the arrival cohort by
country by year level and it is the number of people from that cohort and country still
remaining in the dataset in that year. I continue to only look at individuals in their first
interview wave, but conduct my analysis at an annual, instead of monthly level, in order to
obtain enough variation and non-zero observations. In addition, I add people who are self-
employed or who have ever been employed in a paid job and are younger than 65. I regress
the numer of migrants on annual real exchange rates; country of birth, year, and arrival
cohort fixed effects; and time-varying country-level characteristics. Again, all coefficients are
estimated separately for EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA foreign-born. In order to deal with
the large number of zeros in the dependent variable, I estimate the model with a Poisson
regression. The results are presented in Table 1.6 and they provide additional evidence that
migrants return home sooner (later) in response to a depreciation (appreciation) of their
home currency. The coefficient on the exchange rate implies that a 10% depreciation of
EU/EFTA immigrants’ home currency reduces their stock in the UK by about 16% but has
no effect on non-EU/EFTA migrants. That is quite a large effect but it also estimated with
a relatively wide confidence interval.
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1.6.3 Migrant returns - stocks from the APS
Finally, in this section, I conduct another test of the effect of exchange rates on aggregate
stocks of migrants, this time using data on overall numbers of foreign-born resident in the UK,
published by the UK Office of National Statistics and derived from the Annual Population
Survey. The data are at a country of origin and year level and include all migrants, including
minors and retirees. I run the same regression as in Table 1.6, minus arrival cohort fixed
effects. The results are in Table 1.7 and are broadly similar to those in Table 1.6.
1.6.4 EU/EFTA migrant returns - treatment vs. selection
My results are consistent with a hypothesis that non-EU/EFTA migrants, who face high
international mobility costs when traveling in and out of the UK, react to exchange rate
shocks by adjusting their labor supply within the UK. On the other hand, EU/EFTA foreign-
born respond by altering the timing of their return to the home country. An interesting
question is why exactly the latter occurs. One possibility is that there is an EU/EFTA
“treatment effect” – once a country joins the EU, its citizens face lower costs of migration
and are more likely to respond to exchange rate shocks by moving in or out of the UK.
Another explanation is a selection effect – once a country joins the EU, the types of migrants
it sends to the UK are different from the earlier migrants in ways that make them more likely
to respond to exchange rate fluctuations in that manner (perhaps they are “opportunistic,”
short-term migrants but note that this selection could occur precisely because the costs of
migration are lower). In order to distinguish between these two competing hypotheses, I
use the fact that there is a group of countries in the sample which joined the EU during
the sample period (see appendix Table A.1). I restrict the sample only to those 13 new
EU member countries and only to the period when they are EU members. I then compare
the cohorts that arrived in the UK before the country’s membership in the EU to those
that arrived after. Under the “treatment effect” hypothesis, there should be no difference in
their responses to exchange rate shocks, while under the “selection” effect, the cohorts that
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arrived later should be more responsive. I then regress the individual attrition variable (see
section 1.6.1) on my exchange rate measure, separately for the two groups. The results are
presented in Table 1.8 where the first columns, labeled as “EU cohorts,” refer to migrantrs
who arrived after their countries joined the EU and the “non-EU cohorts” to those who
arrived earlier. The coefficients on exchanges rates are positive in all four model for the
EU cohort migrants, whereas the ones for non-EU migrants are negative in models (2) –
(4), lending some support to the selection hypothesis. However, they are generally not
statistically significant at conventional levels and neither are the differences between them,
reported in the row of Table 1.8 labeled “Ln(exrate) difference.”
1.7 Robustness checks
I argue that the primary difference between EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA migrants
which would affect their response to exchange rate shocks is the cost of migrating into and
out of the UK. However, those two groups likely vary along other dimensions, some of which
may also impact their response to exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore, in this section, I
propose several robustness checks of my results.
1.7.1 European and high-income countries
It is possible that migrants’ origin countries affect their response to exchange rates in
ways that are not fully captured by the country of birth dummies and time-varying country-
level controls. For example, one might expect that migrants from less developed and more
developed countries face different opportunity costs of migration. Therefore, in this section
I present the results of earnings and attrition regressions where the sample is limited only to
countries in Europe, along with several high-income countries with meaningfully large pop-
ulations in the UK: the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and South Korea. Those non-EU European and other high-income countries are
likely a better comparison group to the EU/EFTA. The results for earnings are in Table 1.9
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and for attrition in Table 1.10. The attrition results are quite similar to the main results
in Table 1.5. For earnings, non-EU migrants seem more responsive to exchange rate shocks
than in the baseline results, with an elasticity of -0.387 in model (1). However, the point
estimate gets closer to zero and loses statistical significance as more controls are added. This
may indicate that migrants from EU/EFTA countries are, in fact, more similar to those from
other relatively wealthy countries.
1.7.2 New EU members
Another way to control for the migrants’ origin countries is to limit the analysis only to
the set of EU/EFTA members which joined those organizations during the sample period.
In Table 1.11 and Table 1.12, I only look at the 13 new EU members which joined in 2004,
2007, and 2013. Thus, the non-EU countries are the same as the EU ones but in the years
before they joined the organization. The estimated elasticity of earnings with respect to
the exchange rate is very large in model (4) for non-EU migrants and significant at the
5% level. However, the sample size is very small, consisting of only 514 observations. The
other exchange rate coefficients are not statistically significant. For attrition, the coefficients
on exchange rates are not significant for EU/EFTA countries but are significant (at 10%
in models (1) and (3) and 5% in model (2)) for non-EU/EFTA ones, except in model (4).
However, due to small sample sizes, the results should be interpreted with caution.
1.7.3 Long-term migrants
There is substantial evidence in the literature that migrants are most likely to return
to their home countries within the first few years after the initial migration (Constant and
Massey, 2003). It is possible that migrants who remain in the UK for a longer time are more
similar to one another, regardless of their countries of origin. Therefore, in Table 1.13 and
Table 1.14, I present the results of regressions of earnings and attrition, respectively, where
the sample is limited to migrants who have been in the UK for more than 5 years. The
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results are very similar to the baseline ones: exchange rate depreciations are correlated with
lower earnings for non-EU/EFTA migrants and higher attrition for EU/EFTA ones.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the responses of international migrants in the UK to changes
in the exchange rate of their home currencies against the UK pound. I hypothesized that
migrants from EU/EFTA countries, who face lower international mobility costs vis-à-vis the
UK, would respond differently to exchange rate shocks from non-EU/EFTA migrants, who
generally face greater obstacles to migrating into the UK. My results show that both types
of migrants respond to favorable exchange rate shocks by reducing their labor supply in the
UK, but the margins of response are different for the two groups. EU/EFTA foreign-born
adjust the timing of their return home, whereas non-EU/EFTA ones remain in the UK but
alter their labor supply on the intensive margin. There is weak evidence that EU migrants
who came to the UK after their country joined the EU are more responsive to exchange
rate shocks than those who came before but more research is needed on the selection vs.
treatment question.
29
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of LFS and country-level variables.









Panel A: Individual-level controls
Years since arrival 16.7 15.8 2 42 19.4 14.6 3 41
Age 37.9 11.6 25 55 40.8 10.8 27 56
Female 0.52 0.47
Married 0.52 0.74
Less educated 0.47 0.44
Industry of employment
Manufacturing 0.18 0.12
Wholesale and retail trade 0.13 0.13
Hotels and restaurants 0.091 0.079
Transport, storage, communication 0.074 0.07
Real estate and renting activities 0.13 0.14
Education 0.085 0.087
Health and social work 0.13 0.2
Other 0.19 0.18
Panel B: Country-level controls
Real GDP per capita 33.3 10.2 21 45.1 12.5 15.2 2.22 39.6
Trade with the UK 24.9 23.5 1.85 64.6 6.39 13.2 0.125 9.76
Polity2 score 9.8 0.43 9 10 5.7 4.9 -3 10
Deaths in conflicts 0.0012 0.011 0 0 0.77 1.8 0 2.2
Deaths in disasters 0.24 1.6 0 0.2 1.7 6.3 0 3
People affected by disasters 19 196 0 5.8 12379 48447 0 23215
Panel C: Labor market outcomes
Gross weekly earnings (2010 GBP) 443 434 136 822 477 465 121 912
Actual hours in both jobs, incl. OT 37 14.2 16 52 35.9 14.5 16 51
Actual hours in main job, incl. OT 36.6 14.1 16 50 35.5 14.4 16 50
Actual hours in main job, excl. OT 34.1 12.5 16 45 33.3 12.8 16 45
Worked OT 0.14 0.11
Has a second job 0.037 0.038
Is looking for a new job 0.092 0.1
Is looking for an additional job 0.083 0.09
Would like to work more 0.16 0.18
N 19103 29314
Notes. OT - overtime. EU - European Union, EFTA - European Free Trade Agreement. EU/EFTA status is
determined by country of birth and its membership in EU or EFTA at the time of the migrant’s interview. Would
like to work more is a union of two questions: the migrant is looking for an additional job, the migrant would like to
work more hours at the current wage rate.
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Table 1.2: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) -0.068∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.031) (0.025) (0.021)
Years since arrival 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
(Years since arrival)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.078∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.434∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.029) (0.029)
Married -0.037∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Less educated -0.427∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.045)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.100
(0.058)
Ln(trade with the UK) 0.017
(0.020)
Polity 2 score 0.000
(0.003)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.001
(0.005)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.001
(0.004)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.000
(0.001)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes
N 48417 47701 47701 38742
R2 0.110 0.276 0.344 0.339
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. All regressions
estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, month × year, and industry of employment
level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.3: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) 0.108 0.036 -0.007 -0.041 -0.098∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.128) (0.130) (0.177) (0.036) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Years since arrival 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.009∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
(Years since arrival)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.089∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.444∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.047) (0.052) (0.046) (0.029) (0.029)
Married -0.007 -0.013 -0.022 -0.042∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.040∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018)
Less educated -0.361∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.057) (0.062) (0.038) (0.042) (0.055)
Ln(real GDP per capita) 0.031 0.018
(0.103) (0.077)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.007 0.014
(0.057) (0.024)
Polity 2 score 0.035 0.002
(0.054) (0.004)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.015 0.001
(0.019) (0.005)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Ln(real exrate) difference 0.205 0.131 0.084 0.042
(0.182) (0.139) (0.140) (0.205)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 19103 18851 18851 15123 29314 28850 28850 23619
N 48417 47701 47701 38742 48417 47701 47701 38742
R2 0.116 0.286 0.356 0.353 0.116 0.286 0.356 0.353
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. All regressions
estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, month × year, and industry of employment
level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Ln(actual hours in both jobs, incl. OT) 0.082 0.093 -0.017 -0.026 0.099 0.120
(0.098) (0.107) (0.010) (0.017) (0.102) (0.124)
Ln(actual hours in main job, incl. OT) 0.091 0.098 -0.019∗ -0.032∗ 0.110 0.130
(0.108) (0.110) (0.010) (0.017) (0.111) (0.120)
Ln(actual hours in main job, excl. OT) 0.110 0.116 -0.017∗ -0.029 0.127 0.145
(0.099) (0.105) (0.010) (0.017) (0.103) (0.112)
Worked OT -0.053 -0.110 0.006 0.003 -0.059 -0.112
(0.072) (0.068) (0.015) (0.016) (0.072) (0.069)
Has a second job 0.006 0.007 0.008∗ 0.013 -0.002 -0.006
(0.020) (0.025) (0.005) (0.008) (0.025) (0.031)
Is looking for a new job -0.025∗∗∗ -0.033 -0.012 -0.026∗ -0.014 -0.007
(0.005) (0.022) (0.007) (0.013) (0.031) (0.033)
Is looking for an additional job -0.008 0.012 -0.017∗∗ -0.032∗∗ 0.009 0.044
(0.018) (0.034) (0.008) (0.014) (0.032) (0.038)
Would like to work more 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.029 0.009 0.030
(0.009) (0.034) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.051)
Notes. The dependent variable is indicated in the first column. Would like to work more is a union of two questions:
the migrant is looking for an additional job, the migrant would like to work more hours at the current wage rate. Only
regression models (3) and (4) from Table 1.3 are presented. The last two columns show the difference in coefficients
between EU and non-EU migrants. All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country
of birth, month × year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.5: Attrition from the survey and real exchange rates.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate over next 12 mos.) 0.365∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008
(0.188) (0.137) (0.134) (0.154) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Years since arrival -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Years since arrival)2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.023∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.036∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Married -0.048∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Less educated 0.025∗∗ 0.020 0.014 0.024∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.017∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.061 0.027
(0.128) (0.068)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.046 -0.001
(0.061) (0.027)
Polity 2 score 0.042∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.014) (0.002)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) -0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.003)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.003)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.005∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Ln(exrate) difference 0.376* 0.438*** 0.441*** 0.475***
(0.190) (0.140) (0.137) (0.156)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Attrition in sub-sample 0.456 0.455 0.455 0.451 0.447 0.446 0.446 0.439
N (sub-sample) 17492 17358 17358 15114 27461 27135 27135 23590
N 44953 44493 44493 38704 44953 44493 44493 38704
R2 0.055 0.094 0.096 0.099 0.055 0.094 0.096 0.099
Notes. The dependent variable is individual-level attrition from the LFS. It is equal to 0 if the migrant is observed
in both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS and 1 if they are observed only in wave 1. All regressions estimated with OLS,
with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, month × year, and industry of employment level. Significance
levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.6: Aggregate migrant stocks from the LFS, by arrival cohort.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(real exrate) -1.741∗ -1.599∗ -1.568∗ -0.172 -0.041 -0.048
(0.890) (0.910) (0.887) (0.128) (0.097) (0.096)
Log(population) -4.005∗∗∗ -4.086∗∗∗ 2.474∗∗∗ 2.527∗∗∗
(1.148) (1.145) (0.849) (0.819)
Log(real GDP per capita) 0.700∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.187) (0.423) (0.429)
Ln(trade flow) 0.042 0.019 -0.013 -0.010
(0.216) (0.208) (0.053) (0.053)
Polity2 score 0.064 0.057 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.051) (0.056) (0.009) (0.013)
Log(deaths in organized violence) 0.007 -0.012
(0.020) (0.019)
Log(deaths from disasters) 0.020 -0.019
(0.028) (0.012)
Log(people affected by disasters) -0.006 0.003
(0.012) (0.012)
Ln(exrate) difference -1.569* -1.558* -1.520*
(0.884) (0.915) (0.898)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arrival cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 5943 4079 4079 20652 13830 13830
N 26595 17909 17909 26595 17909 17909
R2
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of migrants in a particular country of birth × year × year of arrival in
the UK cell. All regressions estimated with a Poisson model, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth,
year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.7: Aggregate foreign-born stock estimates, PPML.
EU countries Non-EU countries
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(real exrate) -2.430∗∗ -1.917∗∗∗ -1.874∗∗∗ -0.075 -0.060 -0.060
(1.060) (0.733) (0.721) (0.055) (0.047) (0.047)
Log(population) -3.621∗∗∗ -3.710∗∗∗ -0.231 -0.249
(1.205) (1.224) (0.512) (0.499)
Log(real GDP per capita) 0.702 0.730 0.298∗∗ 0.318∗∗
(0.509) (0.473) (0.140) (0.145)
Ln(trade flow) 0.233 0.215 0.033 0.026
(0.177) (0.173) (0.069) (0.068)
Polity2 score -0.018 -0.021 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.040) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(deaths in organized violence) -0.058 0.008
(0.037) (0.006)
Log(deaths from disasters) 0.005 -0.003
(0.012) (0.006)
Log(people affected by disasters) -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Ln(exrate) difference -2.356** -1.857** -1.814**
(1.062) (0.733) (0.722)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 470 354 354 1719 1210 1210
N 2189 1564 1564 2189 1564 1564
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of migrants in a particular country of birth × year × cell, estimated
by the ONS. All regressions estimated with a Poisson model, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth,
year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.8: Attrition from the survey and real exchange rates, EU countries only, by cohort.
EU cohorts Non-EU cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate over next 12 mos.) 0.243 0.354 0.346 0.668∗ 0.076 -0.198 -0.159 -0.079
(0.235) (0.238) (0.238) (0.354) (0.237) (0.384) (0.395) (0.514)
Years since arrival -0.052∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.009 -0.008 -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
(Years since arrival)2 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.011 -0.008 -0.023 -0.102∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.041)
Married -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗ -0.033 -0.039 -0.048
(0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.040) (0.044) (0.057)
Less educated 0.014 0.011 -0.007 0.033 0.028 0.044
(0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) (0.052)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.347 0.259
(0.329) (0.715)
Ln(trade with the UK) 0.118 -0.028
(0.072) (0.260)
Polity 2 score 0.082 0.118
(0.104) (0.115)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(deaths in disasters) 0.004 -0.003
(0.013) (0.022)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.006 0.014
(0.006) (0.010)
Ln(exrate) difference 0.168 0.552 0.505 0.747
(0.182) (0.371) (0.382) (0.541)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Attrition in sub-sample 0.612 0.611 0.611 0.622 0.444 0.444 0.444 0.474
N (sub-sample) 5130 5071 5071 4024 1358 1347 1347 1037
N 7159 7082 7082 5584 6488 6418 6418 5061
R2 0.132 0.167 0.172 0.187 0.113 0.149 0.153 0.167
Notes. The dependent variable is individual-level attrition from the LFS. It is equal to 0 if the migrant is observed
in both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS and 1 if they are observed only in wave 1. Only migrants EU/EFTA countries at
the time of the interview are included. EU cohorts refers to migrants who arrived in the UK when their country of
birth was already a member of the EU/EFTA. All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at
the country of birth, month × year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.9: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates. Only European and high-
income countries included.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) 0.104 0.034 -0.012 -0.052 -0.387∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗ -0.225∗ -0.046
(0.168) (0.131) (0.134) (0.192) (0.100) (0.112) (0.121) (0.211)
Years since arrival 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
(Years since arrival)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.089∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.444∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.048) (0.061) (0.040) (0.040) (0.049)
Married -0.008 -0.014 -0.023 -0.054 -0.046 -0.035
(0.025) (0.023) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035)
Less educated -0.360∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064) (0.044) (0.051)
Ln(real GDP per capita) 0.005 0.719∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.152)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.002 -0.021
(0.060) (0.058)
Polity 2 score 0.035 -0.008
(0.059) (0.023)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.015 -0.035∗
(0.018) (0.017)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.000 -0.004
(0.007) (0.017)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.006)
Ln(real exrate) difference 0.492** 0.309** 0.212 -0.006
(0.179) (0.117) (0.125) (0.282)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 18771 18523 18523 14853 4624 4570 4570 3259
N 23395 23093 23093 18112 23395 23093 23093 18112
R2 0.136 0.321 0.378 0.382 0.136 0.321 0.378 0.382
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. Only includes
countries in Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore.
All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, month × year, and industry
of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.10: Attrition from the survey and real exchange rates. European and high-income coun-
tries only.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate over next 12 mos.) 0.369∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.065 0.063 0.068 0.026
(0.189) (0.137) (0.135) (0.157) (0.095) (0.092) (0.089) (0.086)
Years since arrival -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
(Years since arrival)2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.023∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.033∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.028∗ -0.032
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
Married -0.049∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)
Less educated 0.025∗∗ 0.020 0.014 0.029 0.025 -0.000
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.028)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.073 0.270∗∗
(0.129) (0.114)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.051 -0.037
(0.061) (0.034)
Polity 2 score 0.042∗∗ -0.021
(0.015) (0.016)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) -0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.013)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.004 -0.010
(0.006) (0.010)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.005∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.007)
Ln(exrate) difference 0.304 0.375** 0.372** 0.440***
(0.211) (0.166) (0.162) (0.136)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Attrition in sub-sample 0.457 0.456 0.456 0.453 0.402 0.400 0.400 0.398
N (sub-sample) 17183 17049 17049 14844 4366 4335 4335 3258
N 21549 21384 21384 18102 21549 21384 21384 18102
R2 0.080 0.130 0.133 0.143 0.080 0.130 0.133 0.143
Notes. The dependent variable is individual-level attrition from the LFS. It is equal to 0 if the migrant is observed
in both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS and 1 if they are observed only in wave 1. Only includes migrants from countries
in Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea. All
regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, month × year, and industry
of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.11: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates. Only new EU/EFTA
members included.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) -0.190 -0.147 -0.175 -0.221 -0.594 -0.540 -0.490 -1.823∗∗
(0.155) (0.105) (0.104) (0.135) (0.634) (0.466) (0.608) (0.715)
Years since arrival 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
(Years since arrival)2 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.039∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) (0.023)
Age2 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.333∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗ -0.655∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.054) (0.074) (0.084) (0.099)
Married -0.002 -0.008 -0.021 0.027 0.045 0.001
(0.021) (0.023) (0.035) (0.086) (0.078) (0.079)
Less educated -0.207∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065) (0.047) (0.067) (0.059) (0.100)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.038 -0.296
(0.201) (1.668)
Ln(trade with the UK) 0.007 -0.407∗∗
(0.063) (0.134)
Polity 2 score 0.323 0.078∗∗
(0.205) (0.031)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.009 -0.028
(0.011) (0.032)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.000 -0.007
(0.008) (0.013)
Ln(real exrate) difference 0.405 0.393 0.314 1.602*
(0.671) (0.545) (0.691) (0.774)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 7519 7425 7425 5150 668 654 654 514
N 8187 8079 8079 5664 8187 8079 8079 5664
R2 0.097 0.258 0.312 0.325 0.097 0.258 0.312 0.325
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. Only includes
new EU and EFTA members, i.e. those which joined either organization during the sample period. All regressions
estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, month × year, and industry of employment
level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.12: Attrition from the survey and real exchange rates. Only new EU/EFTA members
are included.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate over next 12 mos.) 0.118 0.151 0.140 0.213 0.819∗ 0.778∗∗ 0.703∗ 0.215
(0.225) (0.203) (0.194) (0.355) (0.449) (0.339) (0.371) (0.489)
Years since arrival -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.007 -0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
(Years since arrival)2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.030∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.016 -0.013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.029 -0.024 -0.034 -0.059 -0.049 -0.077
(0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.039) (0.061)
Married -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.075∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.109
(0.015) (0.016) (0.026) (0.039) (0.034) (0.072)
Less educated 0.022∗ 0.019 0.010 0.006 -0.011 -0.038
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.055) (0.060) (0.070)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.019 -0.356
(0.267) (1.086)
Ln(trade with the UK) 0.015 0.137
(0.099) (0.220)
Polity 2 score 0.054 -0.037
(0.118) (0.030)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.001 -0.014
(0.010) (0.025)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.007 0.012
(0.005) (0.009)
Ln(exrate) difference -0.701 -0.627 -0.563 -0.002
(0.550) (0.414) (0.417) (0.574)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Attrition in sub-sample 0.574 0.572 0.572 0.588 0.351 0.349 0.349 0.372
N (sub-sample) 6581 6509 6509 5143 661 654 654 514
N 7242 7163 7163 5657 7242 7163 7163 5657
R2 0.102 0.146 0.151 0.163 0.102 0.146 0.151 0.163
Notes. The dependent variable is individual-level attrition from the LFS. It is equal to 0 if the migrant is observed
in both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS and 1 if they are observed only in wave 1. Only includes EU/EFTA countries
which joined either organization during the sample period. All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors
clustered at the country of birth, month × year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5%
*** 1%.
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Table 1.13: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates. Migrants with more than
5 years since arrival.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) 0.166 0.067 0.042 0.077 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗
(0.162) (0.107) (0.092) (0.150) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.030)
Years since arrival -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 0.012∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
(Years since arrival)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.101∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.512∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.435∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.044) (0.049) (0.047) (0.031) (0.036)
Married -0.024 -0.031 -0.047 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.057∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.036) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
Less educated -0.398∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.057) (0.055) (0.038) (0.043) (0.050)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.015 0.000
(0.210) (0.074)
Ln(trade with the UK) 0.020 0.004
(0.082) (0.022)
Polity 2 score -0.009 0.001
(0.039) (0.004)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.019∗ 0.001
(0.010) (0.007)
Ln(deaths in disasters) 0.004 -0.002
(0.010) (0.006)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Ln(real exrate) difference 0.265 0.161 0.124 0.156
(0.181) (0.137) (0.124) (0.200)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 12960 12776 12776 10126 23489 23107 23107 18502
N 36449 35883 35883 28628 36449 35883 35883 28628
R2 0.110 0.289 0.356 0.353 0.110 0.289 0.356 0.353
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. Only migrants with
5 or more years since arrival are included. All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the
country of birth, month × year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 1.14: Attrition from the survey and real exchange rates. Migrants with 5 or more years
since arrival.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate over next 12 mos.) 0.367∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.019
(0.110) (0.143) (0.148) (0.190) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Years since arrival -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
(Years since arrival)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.029∗∗ -0.020 -0.022 -0.023∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.024
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016)
Married -0.033∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.036 -0.027∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.028∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.028) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Less educated 0.031∗ 0.026 0.018 0.031∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.022
(0.017) (0.019) (0.034) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
Ln(real GDP per capita) 0.166∗ 0.023
(0.091) (0.063)
Ln(trade with the UK) 0.003 -0.018
(0.041) (0.022)
Polity 2 score 0.054∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.015) (0.002)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) -0.012 0.002
(0.015) (0.004)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.005 -0.004
(0.010) (0.004)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.007∗ -0.000
(0.004) (0.002)
Ln(exrate) difference 0.377*** 0.436*** 0.435** 0.666***
(0.113) (0.146) (0.150) (0.195)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Attrition in sub-sample 0.366 0.366 0.366 0.355 0.413 0.412 0.412 0.402
N (sub-sample) 11818 11748 11748 10121 21869 21623 21623 18477
N 33687 33371 33371 28598 33687 33371 33371 28598
R2 0.053 0.071 0.073 0.071 0.053 0.071 0.073 0.071
Notes. The dependent variable is individual-level attrition from the LFS. It is equal to 0 if the migrant is observed
in both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS and 1 if they are observed only in wave 1. Only migrants with 5 or more years
since arrival are included. All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth,
month × year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
47
CHAPTER II
The Effect of Bilateral Labor Agreements on Migration
and Remittances: Evidence from the Philippines
2.1 Introduction
Roughly 10 percent of the world’s population—an estimated 736 million people—live on
less than US $ 1.90 per day.1 A large body of social science research has tried to address this
problem by testing interventions designed to increase household income. Although many
of these interventions have been shown to produce substantial gains (e.g., Blattman et al.,
2016; Banerjee et al., 2015), the magnitude of the best existing interventions are about 40
times smaller than the potential gains from allowing a poor person to work in a rich country
(Pritchett, 2018). For instance, Clemens et al. (2019) estimated real wage gains for migrants
from 42 countries moving to the United States, and they found that the workers in the
United States made 4.5 times as much as observably equivalent workers in the median origin
country.2 These benefits are typically unrealized, however, because developed countries erect
substantial barriers to migration. In fact, the annual global costs of existing restrictions on
1 These numbers are from the most recent World Bank estimates as of Fall 2019, but they are based on
2015 data. See World Bank, Decline of Global Extreme Poverty Continues but Has Slowed, Press Release,
September 18, 2019, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/19/decline-of-
global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-world-bank (accesed December 18th, 2020).
2 Clemens et al. (2019) estimate real wage gaps for workers with a range of demographic characteristics,
but these estimates are based on their primary focus: “low-skill males educated abroad (35-39 years old,
nine to twelve years of education acquired in the home country).”
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migration are estimated to be trillions of dollars a year (di Giovanni et al., 2015; Kennan,
2013; Benhabib and Jovanovic, 2012; Clemens, 2011). Finding ways to facilitate legal labor
migration under clearly defined terms is thus perhaps the most promising way to promote
development.
One way developing countries have tried to facilitate labor migration is by signing Bi-
lateral Labor Agreements (BLAs). BLAs are international treaties that regulate flows of
workers. Although they have received little academic attention, hundreds of BLAs have
been signed during the post-war period. The exact provisions and purposes of these treaties
vary, but they typically are signed by relatively poor source countries with excess labor
capacity and relatively wealthier host countries with excess labor demand. The standard
explanation for why treaties are used to regulate these relationships is that both countries
can benefit from BLAs: the source countries want workers to gain employment in foreign
countries and guarantees that their workers will be treated better while they are abroad,
and the host countries want help screening and repatriating migrants.
However, little is known about whether BLAs actually affect the flow or treatment of
workers. This is for two reasons. First, until recently, there was simply not data on which
countries had signed BLAs. Unlike other kinds of international political economy treaties—
e.g. Preferential Trade Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties—BLAs are not con-
sistently tracked by any international organization. It is only in the last few years that
academics have built datasets that document which countries have signed these agreements
(Chilton and Posner, 2018; Peters, 2019). Second, there are limits to existing datasets on
bilateral flows of workers and remittances. Migration flows are not tracked annually for all
pairs of countries, and remittance data has not been widely collected until recently. This
makes it difficult to use cross-country data to make strong claims about the benefits of BLAs
for the countries that sign these agreements.
The lack of academic attention paid to BLAs is notable, especially given the large liter-
ature that has examined the effects of other forms of international treaties. For instance, a
49
large number of papers have studied the effect of human rights treaties (e.g., Lupu, 2015;
Simmons, 2009), international trade treaties (e.g., Eicher and Henn, 2011; Rose, 2004), Bi-
lateral Taxation Treatments (BTTs) (e.g., Azémara and Dharmapala, 2019; Blonigen et al.,
2014; Blonigen and Davies, 2004), and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) (e.g., Neumayer
and Spess, 2005; Peinhardt. and Allee, 2012). The literature that is perhaps most relevant
to BLAs is the body of research on BITs. BITs are similar to BLAs in that the agreements
are signed by pairs of countries where the expectation is typically that flows (capital in the
case of BITs and migrants in the case of BLAs) will go in one direction. Although there has
been some evidence that BITs increase investment, the most recent and sophisticated em-
pirical evidence suggests that BITs have no effect on investment flows (Jones, 2019; Poulsen,
2010). One explanation for this finding is that BITs do not offer enough concrete changes
to alter private parties’ investment decisions, but that, even despite knowing that, countries
still sign the agreements because there are modest political benefits to doing so (Chilton,
2016; Poulsen and Aisbett, 2016). The evidence from other treaties generally, and BITs
specifically, thus provide good reason to be at least initially skeptical about whether BLAs
would result in changes to behavior.
In this paper, we overcome previous data limitations that have made it impossible to
systematically study the effect of BLAs by focusing on a single country: the Philippines. The
Philippines is unique among large countries because it has made exporting labor a central
part of its development strategy. As part of that strategy, in 1982 the government created the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to promote and protect Filipinos
working abroad. The POEA both has signed a large number of BLAs – 68 by 2019 – and
collected a range of data on Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). By combining new data on
BLAs and administrative data from the Philippine government, we are thus able to conduct
what we believe is the most comprehensive examination of the effect of BLAs.
Specifically, we study the Philippine BLA program in two ways. First, we examine
whether the Philippines having a BLA with another country is associated with larger de-
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ployment of Filipino workers to that country. Using annual data on new hires of OFWs
from the POEA, we find that signing a BLA is at best weakly associated with an increase
in new hires overall, but the results are far from statistically significant. Second, we in-
vestigate whether the Philippines having a BLA with another country is associated with
larger remittances to the Philippines from that country. Using monthly remittance data
from the Philippine Central Bank, we find that having signed a BLA is not meaningfully
associated with remittances. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the theory that
the benefits of BLAs are likely to be modest at best.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part 2.2 provides background on BLAs and the Philippine
system of regulating labor migration. Part 2.3 explains our data on the Philippine BLAs,
labor deployment, and remittances. Part 2.4 describes our research design. We then turn
to presenting our results. Part 2.5.1 reports our results assessing the relationship between
signing BLAs and deployment of workers, Part 2.5.2 reports our results on the relationship
between signing BLAs and remittances to the Philippines, and Parts 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 ex-
plore the robustness of our results to a range of alternative specifications. Finally, Part 2.6
concludes by discussing the limitations of our results and the need for future research.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 The Rise and Content of Bilateral Labor Agreements
Bilateral Labor Agreements are legal instruments used to regulate labor migration be-
tween two countries. The pair of countries that negotiate a BLA typically explicitly includes
one “home” country where the migrants are likely to leave and one “host” country where
the migrants go to work. Although the first BLA may have been signed as early as 1893,
this form of treaty only became common after 1945.3 Since WWII, the ratification of these
treaties has fallen into roughly three periods (Wickramasekara, 2015).
3 For a review of the history of BLAs, see Wickramasekara (2015); Plotnikova (2011); Trachtman (2009).
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To illustrate, Panel A of Figure 2.1 plots the total number of BLAs that have been
signed from 1945 to 2018 using data from the Bilateral Labor Agreements Dataset (Chilton
et al., 2017). The first period of BLA formation lasted from roughly 1945 to 1973 and was
primarily defined by rich European countries entering into BLAs with poorer countries on
the periphery of Europe. The second period of BLA signing lasted from roughly 1974 to 1989
and was characterized by limited use of BLAs as stagnation and slow growth in developed
economies reduced the demand for foreign workers. The third period began in roughly 1990
and is notable for the rise of treaties between rich countries in Europe and the Middle East
and labor exporting countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. Although the exact number of
BLAs that were signed during these three periods is unknown, data from the Bilateral Labor
Agreements database suggests that nearly 600 BLAs were signed between 1945 and 2015.4
These approximately 600 BLAs have been signed by a diverse array of countries. Panel
B of Figure 2.1 presents the number of BLAs signed by each country. As the figure shows,
countries in all regions of the world have signed BLAs. The most prolific signers of BLAs
are primarily major destinations for migrant laborers, including Qatar (22), Canada (34),
Germany (41), Italy (58), and France (98). But many labor sending countries have also
signed multiple BLAs, e.g. Indonesia (15), Tunisia (19), and the Philippines (68). In total,
at least 125 different countries have signed at least one BLA (of these, 30 countries signed
exactly 1 BLA).
In addition to having been signed by a diverse group of countries, BLAs vary substantially
by content. There are BLAs that are long, detailed, and legally binding treaties; there are
BLAs that are short, vague, and non-binding memoranda of understanding; and there are
a large number of BLAs that fall somewhere between these poles. Despite this considerable
diversity, there are four elements that are common to most BLAs (Chilton and Posner,
4 As previously noted, the exact number of BLAs is unknown because there is not a centralized interna-
tional organization that systematically tracks them, and individual countries do not even keep good records
of their own BLAs. This has resulted in different estimates of the number of BLAs. For instance, Chilton and
Posner (2018) identified 582 BLAs and Peters (2019) identified 779 BLAs. It is unclear, however, whether
these differences are due to definitional issues, as many BLAs are amendments, protocols, or simple renewals
of previously signed agreements.
52
2018; Trachtman, 2009). First, they typically establish criteria that potential migrants must
meet when seeking employment in the host country (for instance, criteria related to health,
criminal records, or qualifications). Second, BLAs typically require the source state to
take steps to screen workers before they depart and to facilitate the repatriation of workers
when their contracts expire or are violated. Third, they usually place some regulations on
the behavior of both migrant workers and employers. Fourth, BLAs establish institutional
mechanisms for administering the agreement, like regular meetings between the home and
host states. While these four elements are not present in all BLAs, they are core features of
this kind of international agreement.
2.2.2 Prior Research
There have been a handful of papers that have discussed the development of BLAs
generally (e.g., Wickramasekara, 2015), explored specific treaties (e.g., Plotnikova, 2011),
and theorized about their potential effects (e.g., Sykes, 2013). But to our knowledge, only
two papers have empirically examined the use or effect of BLAs. Chilton and Posner (2018)
developed the Bilateral Labor Agreements database, and then used it to empirically test
what had been a conventional wisdom that BLAs were signed by host states that are rich
and have bad human rights records with home states that are poor and concerned with
the rights of their citizens. They found that this conventional account of BLAs fits the
agreements signed with Middle Eastern host countries, but on average BLAs are signed by
pairs of countries with relatively similar levels of wealth and democratization. Chilton and
Posner (2018) also conducted some exploratory analysis of the effect of BLAs on migration,
and found that signing BLAs is associated with increased migration. However, their panel
data on migration between pairs of countries was substantially limited and the trends they
observed appeared to start before BLAs were signed, which led Chilton and Posner (2018)
to conclude that they could not make strong statements about the effect of BLAs.
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Peters (2019) developed a separate database on BLAs and examined when countries are
likely to sign them. Peters (2019) found that, among other things, host states are likely
to sign BLAs when they have small pools of reserve labor (e.g. there is demand for labor)
and when they are remote (e.g. they have difficulty attracting migrants). Peters (2019)
also explored changes in migration for 39 BLAs where OECD data on migration flows was
available. Of those 39 BLAs, Peters (2019) found that 13 resulted in large increases in
migration (defined as increases in migration of 200 percent or more), 10 were associated
with sizable increases in migration (defined as increases in migration of 20 percent to 180
percent), and 16 were associated with either small increases or decreases in migration (this
ranged from a 95 percent decrease to a 7 percent increase). However, Peters (2019) does not
make any claims about which BLAs are likely to produce these changes in migration.
Although Chilton and Posner (2018) and Peters (2019) provide the most comprehensive
assessment of the effects of BLAs, there are several notable limitations of their results. For
one, they are both only able to look at the effect of BLAs on migration generally, and they
do not examine the effect of BLAs on labor migration specifically or on other outcomes like
remittances. Additionally, while they use different data on migration, both datasets include
missing observations for many countries and years. Finally, both papers are primarily focused
on examining why countries sign BLAs, and they only test the effect of BLAs as extensions
of their primary analysis. As a result, there still is not good, comprehensive evidence on the
likely effect of BLAs.
2.2.3 The Philippines and Labor Migration
While it would admittedly be ideal to study the effect of all BLAs that have been signed
around the world, current data limitations make this simply not possible. As a result, we
instead focus on investigating the BLA program of one country: the Philippines. We focus
on the Philippines for three reasons. First, exporting labor has been a principle part of
the Philippines’ development strategy. In response to a surging population and a stagnant
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economy in the early 1970s, the government began to explicitly promote labor migration.
To do so, it extolled the benefits of working abroad to Filipinos at home, actively marketed
the strengths of Filipino workers to overseas employers, and even created a new government
agency to help Filipino workers land labor contracts. Due to these efforts, over the last
forty years, labor migration has become a central part of the social and economic life of the
Philippines. DeParle (2019) recently summarized the importance of labor migration to the
Philippines as follows:
“No country does more to promote migration than the Philippines, where the
government trains and markets overseas workers, whom presidents celebrate as
‘Heroes.’ More than two million Filipinos depart each year, enough to fill a dozen
or more 747s a day. About one Filipino worker in seven works abroad, and the
$32 billion that Filipinos send home accounts for 10 percent of the gross domestic
product.”
In total, the Philippine government estimates that 2.3 million Filipino workers deployed to
work overseas in 2018. Of these workers, roughly 56 percent were women; 51 percent worked
in four countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia (24.3 percent), the United Arab Emirates
(15.7 percent), Kuwait (5.7 percent), and Qatar (5.2 percent)); and 96 percent had a legal
employment contract.5
Second, the Philippines has arguably been more invested in negotiating and signing BLAs
than any other labor exporting country.6 Panel A of Figure 2.2 graphs the number of BLAs
the Philippines has signed over time. The Philippines signed its first BLA with the United
States in 1968. The growth of new BLAs was then slow until after the Philippines passed the
“Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 8042)” (RA-8042).7
5 See Philippine Statistical Authority, Results from the 2018 Survey on Overseas Filipinos, Press Release,
April 30, 2019, available at https://psa.gov.ph/statistics/survey/labor-and-employment/survey-overseas-
filipinos, accessed January 20th, 2020.
6 For more information on the Philippines’ BLA program, see Blank (2011) .
7 See http://www.poea.gov.ph/laws&rules/filesMigrant%20Workers%20Act%20of%201995%20(RA%208042).html,
accessed January 20th, 2020.
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This new law included restrictions on countries that Filipino workers could be “deployed”
to work in based on whether those countries had laws in place that would protect the rights
of migrant workers. Relevantly, Section 4 of RA-8042 provides that:
“The State shall deploy overseas Filipino workers only in countries where the
rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. The government recognizes
any of the following as guarantee on the part of the receiving country for the
protection and the rights of overseas Filipino workers:
(a) It has existing labor and social laws protecting the rights of migrant workers;
(b) It is a signatory to multilateral conventions, declaration or resolutions relating
to the protection of migrant workers;
(c) It has concluded a bilateral agreement or arrangement with the government
protecting the rights of overseas Filipino workers; and
(d) It is taking positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant work-
ers.”
RA-8042 was amended in 2010 by Republic Act No. 10022 (RA-10022)8, which, among
other changes, eliminated Section 4(d) as a sufficient condition for deployment. Although
these may sound like strict requirements, it is worth noting that the Philippines continues
to allow the deployment of Filipino workers in countries notorious for labor violations even
after the passage of RA-10022. It is thus unclear the extent to which this requirement
actually increases the protection of deployed workers. Nevertheless, the number of BLAs the
Philippines signed started to increase dramatically beginning in the late 1990s. By 2019, the
Philippines had signed 68 total BLAs. As Panel B of Figure 2.2 shows, this included BLAs
with countries throughout Southeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America.
Third, the Philippines collects a great deal of data on the Filipino workers that deploy
to work overseas. Notably, Chilton and Posner (2018) and Peters (2019) were only able to
8 See https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/98914/117850/F586226360/PHL98914.pdf,
accessed January 20th, 2020
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examine the effect of signing BLAs on total migration between countries, but not whether
BLAs directly increased migrant worker deployment to the new country. As we explain below
in Parts 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, the administrative data the Philippine government collects makes
it possible to look specifically at labor migration (including labor migration by sector) and
also at remittances returned to the Philippines.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 BLA Data
Our data on the BLAs the Philippines has signed is from Mangulabnan and Daquio
(2019). The government of the Philippines does not have a single, authoritative list of the
BLAs that it has concluded or that are currently valid. Incomplete lists can be found in
several places, such as the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s (POEA) web-
site where roughly 30 BLAs are mentioned.9 Mangulabnan and Daquio, who are researchers
within the Philippine Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), collaborated with
three sub-agencies in 2019—the Institute of Labor Studies (ILS), the POEA, and the Inter-
national Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB)—to document all BLAs the Philippines has previously
signed. During our own meetings with these agencies and the Philippine Department of For-
eign Affairs, officials said that Mangulabnan and Daquio’s research produced what they
believed to be a comprehensive list—but it is possible that an agreement or two may have
been lost over time.
Table 2.1 lists the 68 BLAs that Mangulabnan and Daquio identified through their re-
search. Of these 68 agreements, 43 were still valid by the summer of 2019. Those 43 valid
agreements take several different legal forms: 25 are non-binding Memorandums of Under-
standing (MOUs) or protocols to MOUs, 15 are legally binding Memorandums of Agreement
(MOAs) or protocols to MOAs, 1 is a Memorandum of Cooperation, 1 is a Joint Commu-
9 See http://www.poea.gov.ph/laborinfo/bLB.html, accessed January 20th, 2020.
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nique, and 1 is an “Arrangement.”10 The agreements also lasted for different lengths of
time: 12 had no fixed duration and the remaining 31 lasted from between one year to five
years (however, all are renewed automatically unless terminated). These 68 agreements were
signed with 28 different countries. There are several reasons multiple BLAs were signed with
the same partner countries. Sometimes it was because the BLAs covered different categories
of workers, in other cases it was because agreements had expired. In six cases, it was because
the government signed an agreement and an accompanying protocol at the same time.
2.3.2 Deployment Data
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) is a government agency
which oversees deployment of Filipino workers overseas. Among its tasks are licensing private
recruitment agencies, negotiating bilateral labor agreements with foreign governments, and
monitoring and advertising employment opportunities abroad. In addition, it publishes
certain aggregated statistics on overseas Filipino workers. We use three datasets published
by the POEA:
1. Total Newly Hired Filipino workers by country and occupation annually for 222 coun-
tries for 1992-2016.
2. Combined Newly Hired and Rehired Filipino workers by country annually for 221
countries for 1998-2010.
3. Estimates of total stocks of overseas Filipinos by country and status (permanent, tem-
porary, and irregular), annually, for 1997-2013. These data are only available for
approximately 37 countries between 1997 and 2003, and about 210 countries for the
remaining years.
10 Mangulabnan and Daquio (2019) do not code the 25 agreements that were not valid by the time of their
research. We have acquired the text of all 68 BLAs, and we hope to complete our own coding of the status
of those expired agreements.
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Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of Filipino worker hires across the world. Panel A graphs
the total number of new hires over time, and shows that the number remained steady at
about 200,000 per year until the early 2000s. The number of new hires increased throughout
the 2000s and 2010s, reaching a peak of nearly 600,000 newly deployed overseas workers
per year in 2016. Panel (a) also shows that the number of rehires increased even faster, as
existing overseas workers renewed their contracts. Panel (b) shows the timeline of new hires
in four sectors between 1992 - 2014: (1) production workers, vehicle operators, laborers (2)
professionals and technicians, (3) service workers, and (4) domestic workers.11 After initially
following similar trends, in the mid 2000s the numbers of new hires in these sectors began to
diverge, as new hires of professionals and technicians declined, while new hires in the other
three categories increased.
2.3.3 Remittance Data
We obtained country-level data on incoming remittances from the Philippine Central
Bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). We specifically obtained data from the BSP
at a monthly frequency from 1989 to September 2019.12 Figure 2.4 uses this data to plot
monthly level land-based13 remittances to the Philippines in current USD. In the past twenty
years, incoming remittances have become an important source of revenue for Philippine
households. With the exception of a downturn following the Asian financial crisis, total
remittances have increased every year from negligible levels in 1989 to about $29 billion
dollars—equal to nearly 9% of Philippines’ GDP—in 2018.
11 While we have data for 2015 and 2016, POEA changed the way it classified occupations into sectors for
those years, rendering data for prior years not directly comparable.
12 The definition of remittances used by the BSP is “the sum of net compensation of employees (i.e. gross
earnings of overseas Filipino (OF) workers with work contracts of less than one year, including all sea-based
workers, less taxes, social contributions, and transportation and travel expenditures in their host countries),
personal transfers (i.e. all current transfers in cash or in kind by OF workers with work contracts of one year
or more as well as other household-to-household transfers between Filipinos who have migrated abroad and
their families in the Philippines) and capital transfers between household (i.e. the provision of resources for
capital purposes, such as construction of residential houses between resident and non-resident households
without anything of economic value being supplied in return).”
13 The data allow us to distinguish between remittances from land-based and sea-based workers. We use
land-based remittances in our analysis, as our BLAs apply to land-based workers.
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It is important to note that, although this is the most comprehensive data on remittances
to the Philippines that is currently available, there are several limitations. First, the BSP
data only captures flows of remittances through traditional financial institutions like banks
or wire services like Western Union. The data notably does not capture flows of remittances
through informal channels like Hawala networks or certain forms of new Fintech that bypass
traditional financial networks. Second, the BSP data only counts cash remittances and
does not include estimates of non-cash remittances. For instance, if an Overseas Filipino
Worker from the United States ships a new appliance home, the appliance would not be
counted in the remittance data. Third, the BSP data attributes remittances to the country
from which they are directly transferred into the Philippines. However, some banks that
do not have direct correspondence relationships with banks in the Philippines may route
their transactions through a third country in order to send it to the Philippines. In such
cases, the country recorded as the source of remittances will be the location of the third
country, rather than the true origin. For instance, because many banks without direct
correspondence relationships with the Philippines may first send the remittances to major
banks in the United States, the dataset likely overestimates remittances originating from
America.
These limitations may result in over or under estimation of remittance flows by countries.
That said, these issues are unlikely to bias our results. This is because measurement error
is only likely to cause bias if the error varies based on whether the country has signed a
BLA with the Philippines. The only source of measurement error that may vary at the
country level is the share of banks that route financial transactions through third countries
like the United States. Our discussions with BSP officials suggest that this is primarily a
concern for banks based in the MENA region, but as we discuss in Part 2.5.3, our results
are substantially the same when excluding countries from this region from our analysis.14
14 Another reason these factors may not be a major concern is that officials at the BSP believe that
informal financial networks and Fintech comprised a relatively small share of total remittances as of 2019,
but they played almost no role before 2016. This is significant because onlt 3 of the 19 three year event
windows we examine include years after 2016.
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2.3.4 Summary Statistics
We combine the data sources described above into a country-year dataset for deployment
analysis and a country-month dataset for our remittance analysis.15 Table 2.2 reports sum-
mary statistics from those datasets. Both deployment of Filipino workers and remittances
are very right-skewed, with most countries hiring zero Filipino workers and sending zero
remittances in any given year. In addition to collecting data on BLAs, deployment, and
remittances, we also collected data on factors that are likely to influence the probability
that the Philippines would sign a BLA with a country and that are also likely to influence
deployment and remittances to use as control variables. These include data on basic features
of the potential host countries (their GDP per capita, population, and Polity 2 score), data
on the relative political and economic conditions in the Philippines and the host countries
(GDP per capita ratio and Higher Polity Score), and data on the economic and political
relationship between the Philippines and the host countries (total trade, BIT in the past,
and their ideological distance based on UN voting).
2.4 Research Design
We use an event study research design to assess changes in deployment and remittances
after a BLA goes into effect.16 An event study is a widely used statistical method that relies
on establishing a control group that would have likely developed similarly over time to the
treatment group if it were not for a given change in policy (MacKinlay, 1997; Chetty et al.,
2014; Rozema and Schanzenbach, 2019). The method relies on measuring changes in the
15 However, the only variables available at a monthly level are remittances, BLAs, and BITs. All other
variables are annual.
16 The literature empirically evaluating international treaties has been repeatedly criticized for failing to
use methods that can plausibly identify the effect of ratifying international agreements (Chaudoin et al.,
2018; Chilton and Tingley, 2013; Lupu, 2013; von Stein, 2005). Although there are a number of reasons for
this criticism, the primary objection to prior research is failure to adequately account for the endogenous
nature of treaty ratification. We are unable to change the fact that treaties are not randomly assigned,
but we attempt to provide more credible estimates in two ways: (1) clearly graphing and presenting data
instead of reporting black-box regression results and (2) by using a research design that utilizes transparent
treatment and control groups.
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outcomes of interest for the treatment group relative to the control group during the period
before the policy change and then the period after the policy change.
We believe an event study is the most appropriate research design to study the effect
of BLAs for two reasons. First, using standard panel regression methods may obscure the
counterfactual that is implicitly being used to assess the effect of signing BLAs. This is,
in part, because BLAs are adopted at different times and they are in effect for different
time periods. Some BLAs are replaced after their initial term, others are allowed to expire.
It is thus difficult to understand what is being estimated by a panel regression where the
treatment units change over time. An event study approach allows us to focus in directly on
changes in policy and establishes a specific control group for those changes, providing a clear
counterfactual against which to assess our results. Second, there may be long term changes
in the migration patterns of Filipino workers to a given country. Changes that occur over a
long period in this way may be difficult to account for in a panel regression framework. An
event study instead restricts the sample to the years around the adoption of a BLA, which
increases our confidence that any changes we observe are due to the adoption of a BLA and
not long term trends that are picked up by a panel regression.
To create the samples for our event studies, we define an event as a new BLA’s being
signed by the Philippines and another country. We define event windows as the three year
period before and the three year period after a BLA is signed17. Therefore, for dependent
variables measured at an annual frequency we use seven years of data, with year zero being
the year the treaty signed. For monthly variables, we use seventy-three months of data.
For each event, we match a “treated” country which signed a BLA with the Philippines to
“control” countries where there was no BLA with the Philippines adopted during the seven-
year window. After developing a set of control countries for each treatment event, we stack
all events around event time, and compare the treated countries to the control countries.
With the stacked event study datasets, we test for the significance of changes after adopt-
17We experiment with alternative durations of the event window and report the results in section 2.5.3
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ing a BLA by estimating Equation 1.
yijt = α + βtreat,ij + βpost,jt + βtreat,ij × βpost,jt + γit + ζitp+ ηi + φj + ψt + εijt (2.1)
for host country i, event j, and year t. βtreat,ij is an indicator for the treated country in
the treatment event, βpost,jt is an indicator for the post-treatment period within the event
window. The interaction βtreat,ij × βpost,jt is the coefficient of interest, which indicates the
changes in either deployment or remittances attributable to the adoption of BLAs. γit is a
vector of control variables that measure time varying aspects of host country i, and ζit is a
vector of control variables that measure time varying aspects of the relationship between the
host country and the Philippines. The specification also includes host country fixed effects
ηi, event fixed effects φj (which turn on for both the treatment and control countries in the
event), and year fixed effects ψt.
18
This stacked event study approach results in several dimensions of correlation in the error
term εijt.
19 First, a given country-year observation can appear multiple times in our sample.
This is because stacking treatment events allows a given observation to appear for all events
where it would be appropriate. For instance, the observation for Australia in the year 2000
may be used as a control observation for the event window around the 2002 Philippines —
United Kingdom BLA and for the event window around the 2001 Philippines — Norway
BLA. This creates correlation between the error terms for observations that appear multiple
times in the sample. This is accommodated by clustering standard errors by country. Second,
there may be common shocks in migration patterns that appear to all host countries in a
given time. For instance, an economic downturn in the Philippines may lead to an increase
in migrant workers seeking overseas employment. This creates correlation between the error
terms for observations for a given year. We thus additionally cluster standard errors by
18 Our deployment data is measured annually, so we are only able to include year fixed effects. Our
remittance data, however, is measured monthly. For the remittance regressions, we thus include month-by-
year (e.g. April 2001, January 2015) fixed effects.
19 This approach builds on Rees-Jones and Rozema (2019).
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year.20 Finally, our selection of control countries at the event level may lead to correlation
across all observations within a given event. We account for this by also clustering standard
errors by event. We use the approach developed by (Correia, 2016) to perform multi-way
clustering for our regressions.
It is important to note that this approach to clustering significantly reduces our statistical
power. That said, although our regressions include a large number of observations because
of the large number of control observations for each treatment, they are better understood
as the number of treatment events where we have data with a three year window before
and after ratification (this is 14 treatment events for labor deployment and 19 treatment
events for remittances). This conservative approach to clustering thus accounts for the true
underlying statistical uncertainty in our research design.
2.5 Results
We now turn to estimating the effect of the Philippine BLAs. Part 2.5.1 presents our
results estimating the effect of signing BLAs on deployment of Filipino workers, and Part
2.5.2 presents our results estimating the effect of signing BLAs on remittances back to the
Philippines. We then turn to exploring the robustness of these results. Part 2.5.3 discusses
a range of alternative specifications we estimate to assess the robustness of our results, and
Part 2.5.4 shows the sensitivity of our primary results to these alternative specifications.
2.5.1 Deployment
To begin by examining the raw data, Figure 2.5 graphs the number of new hires (in
logs) that are deployed from the Philippines in all sectors in the three years before and after
the signing of BLAs. Although the Philippines has signed 68 BLAs in total, Figure 2.5 only
reports 14 plots. This is because we restrict our sample in several ways: (1) we treat multiple
20 For the remittance regressions, we instead cluster standard errors at the month-by-year level. This can
account for any common shocks that may occur in a given month.
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BLAs signed on the same day as a single BLA (e.g. when countries signed an MOU and a
MOU protocol on the same day); (2) we exclude countries that signed more than one BLA
with the Philippines in the six year event window (unless, as just noted, they were signed on
the same day); (3) we drop countries for which we do not have deployment data for the entire
six year event window; (4) we only use countries for which we have non-missing observations
of all control variables21; and (5) we drop countries which have zero deployment of Filipino
workers in any year in the event window. The raw data in Figure 2.5 shows that Filipino
labor deployment to host countries that have signed BLAs with the Philippines follows a
range of patterns. For instance, deployment appears to have increased in the years after
the Philippines signed a BLA with Saudi Arabia in 2005 and 2013, but decreased after the
Philippines signed a BLA with Papua New Guinea in 2013.
Figure 2.6 collapses the data from these 14 countries into a single graph. The “treated”
group line reports the average number of new deployments in the three years before and
after a country signed a BLA with the Philippines. The “control” group line reports the
average number of new deployments for a sample of control countries that were identified
for each event using the stacked event study method described in Part 2.4. There are two
trends in Figure 2.6 worth noting. First, unsurprisingly, the average number of new hires
is dramatically higher for the treated countries where a BLA is signed than the control
countries where a BLA was not signed. Second, both lines slope gently upward. Although
the treated line may have a very slight change in slope in the years after BLAs were signed,
it is at best a very modest change.
Table 2.3 estimates Equation (1) using the sample graphed in Figure 2.6, with the nat-
ural logarithm of new hires as the dependent variable. In Table 2.3, and all subsequent
analysis, we estimate five regression specifications: Column (1) does not include any control
variables; Column (2) includes controls for three features of the host countries (GDP per
capita, population, and Polity 2 score); Column (3) includes controls for two features of the
21We relax this assumption in our robustness check in the Appendix section B.7
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relationship between host and sending countries that Chilton and Posner (2018) identified
as influencing the probability that countries would sign BLAs (their relative GDP per capita
and if the host has a higher Polity 2 score); Column (4) includes controls for three aspects of
the relationship between the Philippines and the host countries (the total trade between the
countries, if they have previously signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and whether they
vote similarly at the United Nations); Column (5) includes all eight of these control variables
simultaneously. All five specifications include 14 treatment events—the same that are shown
in Figure 2.5.
The point estimates for having signed a BLA in Table 2.3 are all very close to zero, except
in model (3) which suggests a BLA increases deployment by 14.8%. However, none of the
estimated effects are statistically significant at conventional significance levels. In fact, the
confidence intervals are quite large and admit a range of both sizable positive and negative
effects.
Figure 2.7 and Table 2.4 further explore the relationship between signing a BLA and
deployment of Filipino workers by examining if there are heterogenous effects for different
employment sectors. Like the overall results in Figure 2.6, the plots in Figure 2.7 suggest
that, even when the data is broken out by sector, there is at best a very modest increase for
the treated countries relative to the control countries after signing a BLA. These results are
further confirmed by the regressions in Table 2.4, where we estimate the same five regression
specifications for these alternative dependent variables (we omit the inclusion of control
variables). Like with the overall results in Table 2.3, the estimates are mostly positive
(except in the case of professional workers) but never statistically significant. This suggests
that having signed a BLA does not result in major increases in the deployment of Filipino
workers in any of these major employment categories.
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2.5.2 Remittances
We now turn to studying the association between BLAs signed by the Philippines and
remittances to the Philippines. Figure 2.8 begins by graphically exploring the trends in
remittances in the years before and after the Philippines signed BLAs with the corresponding
country. Like with deployment, BLAs appear to have varying effects. For some countries,
such as Kuwait, remittances increase dramatically immediately following the BLA. But for
other countries, like Spain, the BLAs appears to have little or no effect. There is thus not a
uniform pattern of remittance flows after a BLA is signed.
Figure 2.9 collapses these countries into a single graph and adds a control group using
the method explained in Part 2.4 to generate the sample. Like the results for deployment
shown in Figure 2.6, Figure 2.9 reveals that the average remittances are higher and noisier
for treated countries than control countries, and that there may be a slight increase in
remittances over time for both groups of countries. But the two trends remain roughly
parallel in both the pre and post-treatment periods.
Table 2.5 estimates Equation (1) using the sample graphed in Figure 2.9 while using
log(monthly remittances) as the dependent variable. The Columns in Table 2.5 use the
same pattern of adding control variables as the specifications in Part 2.5.1. The coefficients
for signing a BLA are again close to zero, except in column (3), and none achieve statistical
significance.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity
Our primary results suggest that the BLAs the Philippines has signed have not had
a statistically significant effect on either the deployment of Filipino workers or the return
of remittances to the Philippines. However, we ran a range of robustness checks to test
whether our results are dependent on the choices we made for our primary specifications. In
addition, we wish to explore if there is heterogeneity in the impact of BLAs by type of treaty
or geography. The results of all these tests are reported in the Appendix and summarized
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in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 (which we discuss below in Part 2.5.4).
Subsetting Based on Legal Status. As described in Part 2.3.1, the BLAs that the
Philippines has signed may have varied in their domestic and international legal status. We
conducted a series of robustness checks to assess whether BLAs have heterogenous effects
depending on these differences. First, the Philippines has negotiated both legally binding
MOAs and non-binding MOUs. One possibility is that only the legally binding MOAs have
had an effect. We thus limited our treatment observations to MOAs22. Second, many BLAs
are simply revisions or renewals of previously signed treaties. It is possible that such follow-
up BLAs will lead to few legal changes in either country. It is also possible that subsequent
BLAs with have more modest effects because the employment relationship will already have
formed after the first BLA (which would bias our results towards zero). We tested for this
by restricting our analysis to only the first treaty per country and excluding countries from a
potential set of control countries after they have signed at least one BLA. Third, in 1995 the
Philippines passed a law called “RA-8042” that majorly reformed its labor law. It regulated
deployment of workers and introduced the BLA requirement (which could be waived if other
conditions were met). We account for this by ignoring any treaty signed before 1995. Fourth,
in 2010 the Philippines passed a law called “RA-10022” that further strengthened the rules
for deploying workers overseas. We thus look at only treaties signed after RA-10022, ignoring
all preceding treaties. Finally, for comparison with the previous regression, we look only at
treaties signed before RA-10022. Table B.1 and Table B.2 report the results when adjusting
the sample to account for these differences in the legal statuses of agreements.
Subsetting Based on Geography. Our baseline regressions were estimated using up
to 222 countries to generate our event study samples. There are good reasons to think,
however, that the estimates may be heterogenous across regions. First, because remittances
22We used a 1-year event window in this specification because none of the countries which signed MOAs
during 3-year event windows are control countries in any other 3-tear event window. This results in the
treatment coefficient’s being collinear with the fixed effects for those countries.
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may show up as originating from countries other than the true source if they are rerouted
before being transmitted to the Philippines, we drop offshore financial centers (OFCs) where
many financial institutions are located (indeed, many of those places show up as substantial
sources of remittances, even though there is zero or almost zero deployment of workers to
them).23 Second, we were told by the Philippine Central Bank that remittance data tend
to be more reliable for Asian countries, and that most Filipino migrants end up working in
other Asian countries. We thus estimated our regressions when only using Asian countries
as both treated and control units. Third, during our field research, we were repeatedly told
that the Philippines is particularly concerned about welfare of their workers deployed to the
Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region.24 We thus estimated our results when only
using only MENA countries as both treatment and control units (and when excluding MENA
countries). Finally, in our primary specifications, our starting dataset is the list of countries
used in the hiring and remittance datasets. But these datasets include more countries than
the 194 widely recognized countries. We thus restricted our sample to this standard list of
countries.25 Table B.3 and Table B.4 report the results focusing on these sets of countries.
Subsetting Based on Type of Country. We also restricted our sample by excluding
certain classes of countries where we believed that BLAs were unlikely to have an effect.
Specifically, as Table 2.2 revealed, no Filipino migrants deploy to the median country in
our dataset. Moreover, BLAs are also less likely to have an effect in countries where there
is already high respect for workers’ rights. Table B.5 and Table B.6 estimate regressions
excluding countries with no deployment and countries with Polity 2 scores higher than 7
from the sample (as a corollary, we also estimate regressions using a sample of countries
with only 7 or higher included in the sample).
23 The list of OFCs was obtained from Zorome (2007).
24 Countries included are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen.
25 We specifically based on sample on countries listed in the “Correlates of War” template of countries
by year, but also added Hong Kong (due to its large number of Filipino migrants) and Northern Mariana
Islands (as it has two BLAs with the Philippines).
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Alternative Treatment of the United States. Our primary specifications treated the
United States as a normal partner country. But the United States is a particularly important
labor market for the Philippines, and there are two reasons to think that treating the United
States as a standard country may bias the results. For one, as we described in Part 2.3.3, a
large amount of remittances are routed through the United States. We thus tested whether
our results are robust when excluding the United States from the analysis. Additionally,
the United States signed a BLA with the Philippines in 1968, but it actually only applies to
American military bases in the Pacific. We thus recoded that BLA to apply only to Guam,
American Samoa, and American Virgin Islands instead of all of the U.S.26 The results when
excluding the United States and when re-coding the United States are reported in Table B.7
and Table B.8.
Alternative Event Windows. We tested whether our results were robust to using alter-
native event windows. For the event studies we used for our primary analysis, we defined
an event window as the 36 months before and after a BLA is signed. But it is possible that
BLAs may only have an effect for a shorter time period, or that their effect may take longer
to emerge. We thus re-estimated our results while redefining the event windows to be: 12
months, 24 months, 48 months, and 60 months. The results using these alternative windows
are reported in Table B.9 and Table B.10.
Annual Remittance Data. Although most of our data was measured annually, we cre-
ated a month-level dataset for our remittance regressions. However, we also have annual
estimates of remittances from the BSP. We estimated our results using annual remittances
as a dependent variable. We conducted this robustness test while using 12 month, 24 month,
36 month, 48 month, and 60 month event windows. The results when doing so are reported
in Table B.11.
26 Because the BLA with the United States was signed in 1968—decades before we have data on deployment
or remittances—we were unable to use the United States as a treatment event in our primary analyses. It
was possible, however, for the United States to be part of the control group for our primary analyses.
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Relaxing the constant sample restriction. In all our specifications, we only include
treated and control countries which have non-missing observations for all the covariates used
in our model (5). Due to missing data, this approach causes us to lose a lot of observations
in less demanding specifications (models (1)-(4)) or when data is missing for only part of the
event window. Therefore, we also estimated regressions where we use all available data for
each country which has non-missing observations of the requisite variables. The results are
in Table B.12 and Table B.13.
Panel Regressions. We used the event study research design explained in Part 2.4 for all
the results in Part 2.5.1, Part 2.5.2, and all the robustness checks. Although this approach
has several benefits, it does limit the sample to events when we have complete data. We
thus conducted two robustness checks with a standard panel dataset. For one robustness
check, we estimated a standard difference-in-difference regression with panel data while using
OLS regressions. For another robustness check, we followed an approach from the trade and
investment literature and estimated a Poisson-Pseudo- Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) model
while using our panel data (e.g., Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Jones, 2019). The OLS results
are reported in Table B.14 and Table B.16, whereas the PPML ones are in Table B.15 and
Table B.17.
2.5.4 Sensitivity
The results of the robustness tests described in Part 2.5.3 are largely consistent with our
primary results. To illustrate, Figure 2.10 graphs the point estimates for all the regressions
we estimated examining the relationship between signing a BLA and labor deployment, and
Figure 2.11 graphs the point estimates for all the regressions we estimated examining the
relationship between signing a BLA and remittances.27 The point estimates in these figures
are ordered from the most negative to the most positive. The dots in the first gray box
27 Figures 2.10 and 2.11 do not include the robustness checks that used panel data to estimate OLS and
PPML regressions. This is because their estimated coefficients have a different meaning from that estimated
using the event study method.
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below each line indicate which of the five specifications from Tables 2.3 and Table 2.5 was
used to produce the line, and the dots in the second gray box below each line indicate
which robustness check was used. Our point estimates from our primary results—reported
in Tables 2.3 and Table 2.5—are included in the figures in blue.
Both figures suggest that our estimates are fairly consistent across different regression
specifications. Figure 2.10 shows that the point estimates for 59 of the 100 regression speci-
fications we estimated are positive. Of these estimates, 34 of the point estimates are larger
than 5%. Moreover, none of the estimates are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
Taken together, these estimates suggest that the BLAs the Philippines has signed have had,
at best, a modest positive effect on labor deployment. Additionally, Figure 2.11 shows that
the point estimates for 77 of the 120 regression specifications we estimated are negative. Of
these estimates, 45 of the point estimates are lower than -5% and 37 are greater than 5%.
But again none of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Taken
together, these estimates suggest that the BLAs the Philippines have signed have had no
effect on remittances sent by Filipinos.
2.5.5 Heterogeneity - case study analysis
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 suggest that the associations between hires and BLAs, as well
as remittances and BLAs, do not vary systematically with the legal status of the treaties
or the types of host countries. However, given the substantial diversity in their language
and provisions, BLAs are perhaps best understood as idiosyncratic events whose properties
are not easily summarized by their observable characteristics. Therefore, in this section we
treat each BLA in our sample as a case study and analyze its impact individually, only
for the host country. We estimate that effect non-parametrically, using a synthetic control
approach developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003); Abadie et al. (2010, 2015). Instead
of using all non-treated countries controls for the treated one, this method relies on selecting a
combination of control countries which most resembles the treated country. This combination
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is constructed by minimizing the predicted error of the dependent variable, based on a set
of observable covariates in the pre-treatment period. In our application, we use the full set
of covariates from model (5) in Tables 2.3 and 2.5 to construct the synthetic control.
The results for deployment are presented in Figure 2.12. In each graph, the solid black
line shows the evolution of log new hires in the country which signed the BLA, while the
dashed blue line shows the same for the synthetic control. The treatment event is indicated
by the vertical red line. Thus, the portion of the blue line to the right of the red line can be
interpreted as predicted evolution of new hires in the absence of a BLA. Figure 2.12 suggests
that BLAs may have had an impact on deployment in some cases, but not others. For
example, the Germany 2013 BLA seems to have raised deployment by 1-2 log points relative
to the counterfactual. The same is true for Japan 2009, although the effect does not kick in
until 2 years after the treaty is signed. Interestingly, while the raw data shown in Figure 2.5
suggests that the Bahrain 2003 BLA raised deployment, Figure 2.12 shows that synthetic
control experienced a similar increase over the same time period. It is also notable that for
some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, it is impossible to construct a synthetic control with
similar levels of deployment, exposing the limitation of the approach when analyzing cases
with uniquely large numbers of Filipino workers.
Figure 2.12 shows the results of constructing the synthetic control for remittances. Here,
BLAs seem to have raised remittances from Bahrain (especially the 2007 BLA), New Zealand,
and Qatar. In addition, the Japan 2009 BLA seems to have raised remittances but with a
delayed effect, similar to deployment. This may reflect a delay in the implementation of
the agreement. Also note that BLAs appear to have lowered remittances from Papua New
Guinea, consistent with its effect on hires.
While these results suggest that certain BLAs have an effect on deployment and remit-
tances (both positive and negative), more work is needed to understand why that occurs in
some cases and not others. It is possible that there are treaty specific features, as well as in-




We have explored whether the Philippine Bilateral Labor Agreement program has in-
creased the number of Filipinos who work abroad in countries that are treaty partners and
the amount of remittances to the Philippines from countries that are treaty partners. Our
results suggest that the BLAs that the Philippines has signed has increased neither deploy-
ment, nor remittances. These results thus suggest that signing more BLAs may not be
an easy solution for countries wishing to increase their labor migration, and the financial
benefits of that labor migration.
Before concluding, it is worth noting four limitations to our analysis. First, we cannot
identify the causal effect of signing BLAs on remittances and workers. Simply put, the BLAs
the Philippines government has signed are certainly not random. Instead, the Philippines
has signed BLAs with host countries that were willing to sign treaties committing them to
improving the working conditions of foreigners. These host countries may have begun to
accept more workers, under better conditions, regardless of the treaties.
Second, although we focused on studying the Philippines in large part because we believe
it has the best available data on labor deployment and remittances of any country that
is a major exporter of migrant labor, the data is still not perfect. The POEA estimates
may miscount the number of Filipinos who work abroad in a given country when there is
irregular migration, and it is possible that the rate of irregular migration is correlated with
the existence of a BLA. Similarly, the BPS data on remittances does not capture money
that does not flow through the financial system, and the rate at which people transfer funds
through informal cash networks may also be correlated with the existence of a BLA. These
limitations of the data thus may bias our results or increase our standard errors.
Third, we cannot test all of the effects of the BLAs. These agreements not only try to
ensure that countries will take more workers, but they also try to improve the conditions
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of the workers while they are abroad. For instance, a hope of BLAs is that they will help
ensure that foreign laborers will be provided with safer working conditions. Although we
would ideally like to test these effects as well, we are unaware of cross-country datasets
on the conditions of foreign workers over time. As a result, we are only able to examine
whether BLAs are associated with increases in remittances and hires of foreign workers, and
not whether BLAs improve the welfare of Filipino workers more generally.
Finally, the Philippine BLA program is likely not representative of other countries’ pro-
grams. As previously noted, the Philippines has made facilitating their workers’ traveling
abroad a central part of its development strategy, and it has taken extensive steps to promote
that effort. Other countries that simply sign BLAs without making the other investments
made by the Philippines in promoting and monitoring labor migration thus may not have
had the same experience with BLAs. As a result, our results may not be true of BLAs more
generally. Instead, our results may be best understood as evidence that a Philippines style
BLA program may produce dividends.
Although these limitations prevent us from drawing strong conclusions about the effects
of BLAs, we believe that our results provide the most extensive look at the effect of a form
of international treaties that previously only gained limited attention. And, although future
research is needed with other data and in other settings, the consistency of our results across
a broad range of regression specifications does suggest that the benefits of the Philippines’
BLA program have been modest at best. This in turn suggests that governments seeking to
promote labor migration and improve the experience of those migrants may have to do more
than simply find countries willing to sign bilateral treaties.
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Figure 2.1: Diffusion of Bilateral Labor Agreements
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Figure 2.2: The Philippines Bilateral Labor Agreements
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Table 2.1: List of the Philippines Bilateral Labor Agreements
Country Date Signed Country Date Signed
Bahrain* 12/15/2003 Libya 10/18/1979
Bahrain* 4/4/2007 Libya* 7/17/2006
Cambodia* 12/14/2016 New Zealand* 11/4/2008
Canada 12/18/2006 New Zealand* 9/19/2015
Canada 1/29/2008 Northern Mariana Islands 9/14/1994
Canada 2/8/2008 Northern Mariana Islands* 12/18/2000
Canada 10/1/2008 Norway 6/26/2001
Canada* 9/21/2010 Papua New Guinea 3/14/1979
Canada* 5/19/2012 Papua New Guinea* 11/26/2013
Canada* 10/7/2013 Qatar* 5/10/1997
Canada* 5/8/2015 Qatar* 10/18/2008
Canada* 5/9/2015 Saudi Arabia* 10/21/2005
China* 4/10/2018 Saudi Arabia* 5/19/2013
Germany* 3/19/2013 Saudi Arabia* 4/11/2017
Indonesia* 1/18/2003 South Korea 4/23/2004
Iraq* 11/25/1982 South Korea 12/15/2005
Israel* 9/3/2018 South Korea 10/20/2006
Israel* 9/3/2018 South Korea 5/30/2009
Italy* 12/9/2015 South Korea 5/30/2009
Japan* 1/12/2009 South Korea 4/8/2014
Japan* 11/21/2017 Spain* 6/25/2006
Jordan 11/5/1981 Switzerland* 7/9/2002
Jordan 11/3/1988 Switzerland* 11/14/2014
Jordan 5/27/2010 Taiwan 9/3/1999
Jordan 1/29/2012 Taiwan 1/12/2001
Jordan* 9/6/2018 Taiwan 3/20/2003
Jordan* 9/6/2018 Taiwan* 7/26/2011
Korea* 2017 Taiwan 8/3/2015
Kuwait 9/14/1997 United Arab Emirates 4/9/2007
Kuwait* 3/23/2012 United Arab Emirates* 9/12/2017
Kuwait* 5/11/2018 United Arab Emirates* 9/12/2017
Laos* 7/27/2005 United Kingdom 1/8/2002
Lebanon* 2/1/2012 United Kingdom* 7/30/2003
Lebanon* 2/1/2012 United States of America* 12/28/1968
* BLA is still valid.
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Figure 2.3: Deployment of Filipino Workers Overseas
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Outcome and Control Variables
N Mean SD Median 75th pct 99th pct
Deployment Data (1000s per year)
New hires and rehires 2861 3.48 19.1 .027 .317 87.8
New hires - all sectors 5504 1.44 9.22 .004 .059 42.4
New hires - production workers 5060 .442 3.55 0 .013 15.6
New hires - professional workers 5060 .28 2.96 0 .008 3.99
New hires - service workers 5060 .564 3.52 0 .006 19.5
New hires - domestic workers 5504 .428 3.29 0 .001 13.6
Remittance Data (USD mil.)
Monthly land-based remittances 74985 4.07 31.5 0 .033 91.7
Monthly total remittances 74984 5.05 40.1 0 .042 113
Annual land-based remittances 6097 47.2 363 .003 .457 1078
Annual total remittances 6097 58.5 465 .004 .576 1320
Control variables
GDP per capita of host 5301 16497 19337 9156 23742 92349
Population of host (mil.) 6220 30.2 122 5.41 18.5 323
Polity2 of host 4787 3.05 6.66 6 9 10
GDP per capita ratio (host to PHL) 5301 3.3 3.92 1.82 4.51 19.3
Higher Polity Score in PHL 4787 .619 . 1 1 1
Total trade (USD mil.) 3795 724 2790 11.1 185 15996
BIT in the past 6878 .13 . 0 0 1
Ideological difference 5412 .713 .672 .457 1.21 2.84
Note: summary statistics cover the following periods: (1) Monthly remittances: Jan. 1989 - Sept. 2019; (2) Annual
remittances and control variables: 1989-2018; (3) New hires in all sectors and new hires of domestic workers: 1992-
2016; (4) New hires in production, professional, and service sectors: 1992-2014; (5) New hires and rehires: 1998-2010.
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Table 2.3: Total new hires: all workers. Stacked event model - 3 years around event.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated unit 0.203 0.198 0.143 0.247 0.248
(0.259) (0.220) (0.206) (0.267) (0.223)
Post-treatment period 0.044 0.034 0.035 0.047 0.034
(0.046) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039)
Treated × post-treatment 0.015 0.031 0.148 -0.009 0.013
(0.184) (0.172) (0.185) (0.183) (0.171)
Ln(GDP per capita of host) 2.714∗∗∗ 2.231∗∗∗
(0.572) (0.605)
Ln(population of host) 1.802∗∗ 2.073∗
(0.676) (0.974)
Polity2 of host 0.022 0.012
(0.020) (0.024)
GDP per capita ratio (host to PHL) 0.161 0.072
(0.091) (0.089)
Higher Polity Score in PHL -0.361 -0.251
(0.258) (0.307)
Ln(total trade) 0.176 0.054
(0.113) (0.116)
BIT in the past -0.281 -0.115
(0.360) (0.309)
Ideological difference -0.229 -0.245
(0.212) (0.189)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unique events 14 14 14 14 14
N 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215
R2 0.842 0.853 0.845 0.844 0.854
Note: Only countries with all non-missing controls and dependent variables are included. In addition, countries with
the dependent variable equal to zero in at least one period in the event window are dropped. All models estimated
with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, year and month level, are in parentheses. Significance
levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table 2.4: Deployment results: alterative outcome variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Production workers and laborers
Treated × post-treatment 0.115 0.077 0.090 0.113 0.076
(0.198) (0.267) (0.374) (0.208) (0.295)
N 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596
B. Professional workers
Treated × post-treatment -0.204 -0.444 -0.085 -0.230 -0.403
(0.215) (0.283) (0.236) (0.226) (0.263)
N 1764 1764 1764 1764 1764
C. Service workers
Treated × post-treatment 0.008 0.138 0.124 -0.002 0.120
(0.126) (0.189) (0.144) (0.138) (0.211)
N 1967 1967 1967 1967 1967
D. Domestic workers
Treated × post-treatment 0.117 -0.022 0.142 0.087 -0.049
(0.184) (0.189) (0.357) (0.155) (0.202)
N 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974
E. All hires and rehires
Treated × post-treatment -0.008 0.068 0.174 0.003 0.124
(0.052) (0.138) (0.132) (0.069) (0.158)
N 3220 3220 3220 3220 3220
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, and year levels, are in paren-
theses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5%
*** 1%.
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Table 2.5: Remittances from landbased workers. Stacked event model - 36 months around event.
OLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated unit -0.119 -0.011 -0.180 -0.044 0.005
(0.160) (0.144) (0.147) (0.162) (0.145)
Post-treatment period -0.019∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Treated × post-treatment 0.038 -0.001 0.101 -0.004 -0.015
(0.165) (0.171) (0.159) (0.176) (0.174)
Ln(GDP per capita of host) 2.401∗∗∗ 2.170∗∗
(0.561) (0.840)
Ln(population of host) 2.678∗∗∗ 2.715∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.555)
Polity2 of host -0.049∗ -0.035
(0.027) (0.030)
GDP per capita ratio (host to PHL) 0.064 0.024
(0.092) (0.080)
Higher Polity Score in PHL 0.585∗∗ 0.383
(0.227) (0.238)
Ln(total trade) 0.212∗∗ 0.045
(0.087) (0.063)
BIT in the past 0.363∗ 0.605∗
(0.183) (0.302)
Ideological difference -0.369∗ -0.182
(0.181) (0.146)
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unique events 19 19 19 19 19
N 55115 55115 55115 55115 55115
R2 0.915 0.926 0.916 0.917 0.926
Note: Only countries with all non-missing controls and dependent variables are included. In addition, countries with
the dependent variable equal to zero in at least one period in the event window are dropped. All models estimated
with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, month × year level, are in parentheses. Significance
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CHAPTER III
Impact of Immigrants with Heterogenous
Communication Skills on U.S. Workers’ Labor Supply
3.1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the United States has experienced a substantial influx of im-
migrants. In 2010, the share of foreign-born individuals reached 14% of the total U.S.
population, as high as during the Age of Mass Migration in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). A large portion of those immigrants are rela-
tively less educated, with a high-school degree or less. As a result, concerns have arisen
about the impact of those migration flows on the labor market prospects of less educated
native (U.S.-born) workers. Economists have explored wage and employment consequences
of immigration, as well as the avenues through which native workers respond to it. One
response channel which has received attention in the literature is occupational sorting. Peri
and Sparber (2009) argue that native U.S.-born workers have a comparative advantage over
migrants in tasks requiring verbal and written communication, due to their English language
skills and possession of other forms of U.S.-specific human capital. Conversely, immigrants
have a comparative advantage in manual tasks which require physical strength and dexterity.
Therefore, in response to an influx of foreign-born workers, less educated natives should sort
into occupations which are relatively more intense in communication tasks. Using Census
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data for the period 1960 – 2000, they show that in states with higher foreign-born shares,
U.S.-born workers supply relatively more communication skills and fewer manual ones.
In this paper, I build on the theoretical and empirical framework developed by Peri
and Sparber (2009) and examine how heterogeneity of immigrants’ communication abilities
affects the native response to immigration in the U.S. I argue that in a labor market where
the foreign-born are relatively productive in communication tasks, natives would not sort into
communication-intensive occupations to the same degree as in a location where immigrants
are less efficient in those tasks. That is, higher communication productivity among the
foreign-born should suppress natives’ occupation switching response. In order to capture
migrants’ communication productivity, I experiment with six different measures of foreign-
born communication types1, informed by previous literature and the data. My measures are
based on immigrants’ language skills, years since arrival in the United States, and countries of
origin. I follow Peri and Sparber (2009) in estimating the correlation between natives’ relative
supply of tasks and the foreign-born share but I also interact that share with my measures of
foreign-born type, one at a time. I verify my results with an instrumental variables approach,
using an instrument that I argue is correlated with both state-level foreign-born shares and
my type measures. My findings suggest that natives do switch to more communication-
intensive occupations in response to immigration but only if the migrants are of relatively
low communication types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 briefly summarizes the literature
on the impact of immigration on less educated natives, section 3.3 explains the theoretical
model, section 3.4 summarizes the data and empirical approach, section 3.5 presents the
results, and section 3.6 concludes.
1I use the term communication type to refer to immigrants’ productivity in communication tasks. Thus,
a low communication type immigrant is one who is not able to effectively perform communication tasks in
the U.S. labor market. I do not make any statements about the communication ability of such a migrant in
other countries’ labor markets.
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3.2 Previous literature
The literature on the impact of less educated immigrants on natives’ employment and
wages can be divided into two broad strands. One estimates the effect by comparing foreign-
born shares across some well-defined labor markets, such as states or cities, and correlating
them with natives’ outcomes in those markets. Papers that adopt this approach, e.g. Card
(2007) and Cortes (2008), generally find small effects of immigration on natives. A related
methodology is to study a natural experiment where a plausibly exogenous immigration
shock occurs in a particular labor market. A famous study of that type is Card (1990) who
finds that the Mariel boatlift, which substantially and rapidly increased the labor force in
Miami, had little impact on natives’ employment and wages. Dustmann et al. (2017), who
study Czech workers in a German border region, find stronger effects of migration on natives
but also show that those effects vary with labor force characteristics of the native workers.
A potential shortcoming of comparing different labor markets within the U.S. to one
another is that workers may relocate in response to immigration, hence attenuating any
observed effects on wages and employment. Therefore, the second strand of literature em-
phasizes the importance of examining effects of migration using national data. Proponents
of this approach usually divide native and foreign-born workers into groups based on observ-
able labor market characteristics, such as education and experience. This method generally
results in larger estimated effects of immigration on less educated natives. Some prominent
examples in that literature include Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007).
More recently, authors have focused on imperfect substitutability between foreign-born
and native-born workers by studying how those two groups differ in their task productivities.
If immigrants and natives bring different productive skills to the labor market, immigration
should have limited impact on natives’ wages and employment. Papers that have emphasized
this point include Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Dustmann et al. (2013). Related to the
notion of different distributions of skills is the idea that natives can respond to immigration
by altering the mix of productive tasks they supply to the market, i.e. switching occupa-
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tions. Peri and Sparber (2009) find that less educated U.S.-born workers shift towards more
communication-intensive jobs in response to the arrival of foreign-born who have a compara-
tive advantage in manual tasks. As a consequence, their simulated effects of immigration on
natives’ average wages are negative but close to zero at the national level, although there is
some variation across states. D’Amuri and Peri (2014) conduct a similar analysis for a group
of Western European countries and conclude that less educated migrants in those countries
in the late 90s and 2000s also pushed natives to move away from manual jobs and into more
communication-intensive ones. This resulted in a slight increase in natives’ average wages.
Bisello (2014) replicates the Peri and Sparber (2009) approach in the UK context and finds
an even larger degree of occupational mobility among natives in response to immigration.
Finally, Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011) apply the Peri and Sparber (2009) frame-
work to Spain and find that Spanish-born natives also switch into communication-intensive
occupations as a consequence of immigration. They observe that about half of recent mi-
grants into Spain are from Spanish-speaking countries which suggests that they should be
relatively good substitutes for natives in communication tasks. They hypothesize that this
might mute natives’ occupation switching response. However, their estimated effects are
twice as large as those in Peri and Sparber (2009). One possible reason is that they only
look at migrants who have been in Spain for 5 years or less, a point to which I return later.
3.3 Theory
In this section, I briefly summarize the theoretical model developed by Peri and Sparber
(2009)2 and explain how its predictions motivate my own analysis. A final consumption good













2The model is exactly the same as in Peri and Sparber (2009), except with slightly changed notation.
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where YH and YL are intermediate goods produced by high and low-education workers,











The inputs C and M are communication and manual tasks, respectively, and are supplied
by less educated workers. The less educated labor force consists of foreign-born workers
(indexed by F ) and native ones (indexed by N). Further, each worker i supplies cij =
(1 − lij)δζj communication tasks and mij = lδijµj, where j = F,N ; lij ∈ (0, 1) is the share
of time the worker spends on manual tasks; ζij and µij are the worker’s communication
and manual productivities, respectively; and δ ∈ (0, 1), so that all workers supply positive





is, native workers have a comparative advantage over foreign-born ones in communication
tasks. The equilibrium aggregate relative supply of communication to manual tasks by native









































, equation (3.1) implies that natives’
relative task supply depends positively on the share of foreign-born in the labor force f .
However, it also depends negatively on the relative communication to manual productivity
of the foreign-born, ζF
µF
, or what I refer to as the foreign-born “type.” Moreover, because the
foreign-born type muliplies the foreign-born share in Equation (3.1), a higher foreign-born






foreign-born workers are equally productive in communication tasks to native workers, the
foreign-born share no longer affects natives’ relative supply choice3. In this paper, I focus on
this interaction of the foreign-born share with the foreign-born communication productivity.
3.4 Data and empirical specification








= β0 + βffst + βppst + βfpfst × pst + βs + βt + εst, (3.2)
where ln(CN/MN)st is the aggregate relative supply of communication to manual tasks by
natives in state s and year t, fst is the foreign-born share of the less educated labor force,
pst is the communication type of the foreign-born, fst × pst is the interaction of the share
and the type, βs is a state fixed effect, βt is a year fixed effect, and εst is the error term.
This is similar to the model estimated by Peri and Sparber (2009) except that they did not
control for the foreign-born type and its interaction with the share. I focus my analysis on
the foreign-born share fst and the interaction term fst × pst. Given the theoretical model,
I expect that βf > 0 and βfp < 0, i.e. a higher foreign-born share drives less educated
natives to increase their relative supply of communication to manual tasks but this effect
diminishes if the foreign-born are of a higher communication type. In addition, I follow Peri
and Sparber (2009) in looking at the aggregate supplies of communication and manual tasks
separately. Therefore, I also estimate:
ln (CN)st = βC0 + βCffst + βCppst + βCfpfst × pst + βCs + βCt + εCst (3.3)
3It is also possible that foreign-born workers have higher communication to manual productivity than
natives, in which case the model predictions would be reversed. I consider that case unlikely and do not
elaborate on it further.
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ln (MN)st = βM0 + βMffst + βMppst + βMfpfst × pst + βMs + βMt + εMst. (3.4)
I estimate equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) by ordinary least squares. However, both
foreign-born share and type (and their interaction) may be endogenous with respect to
natives’ aggregate supply of tasks. One concern is that unobserved state-specific demand
shocks may drive both the mix of tasks supplied by less educated natives in the state, as
well as foreign-born immigration into the state (or emigration out of it). Furthermore, the
same demand shocks may affect the type of foreign-born who choose to locate in the state.
Therefore, I also estimate my regressions with an instrumental variables approach. I use data
from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census, as well as the American Communities Survey (ACS)
2001-2019, included in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al.,
2020). In the remainder of this section, I explain how I construct the aggregate task supplies,
the foreign-born shares, and the foreign-born type measures, as well as my instrument for
the potentially endogenous independent variables.
3.4.1 Aggregate task supply measures
My aggregate task measures are constructed using data on occupational characteristics
obtained from the Department of Labor’s O*NET database4, following the method and def-
initions described in Peri and Sparber (2009). The O*NET dataset ranks the importance
of 52 different abilities, such as deductive reasoning and arm-hand steadiness, to each oc-
cupation identified in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). Every occupation is
assigned a value between 1 (not important at all) and 5 (very important) of each ability,
indicating how crucial the ability is in performing the occupation. I link those rankings to
the occupations in the 2000 Census and convert them to percentiles, based on the number
of workers in each occupation. Therefore, a worker with a score of 0.65 in “written expres-
4The O*NET datasets can be downloaded from https://www.onetcenter.org/db releases.html (accessed
November 29th, 2020). I use version 11.0 in this paper.
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sion” supplies that skill more intensely than 65% of the less educated labor force in 2000.
I then construct each worker’s individual supply of communication and manual tasks as an
average of 4 and 19 different abilities, respectively, following the basic definitions in Peri
and Sparber (2009)5. I merge those definitions with the remaining Census and ACS years
using the variable occ1990, which is a time-consistent classification of occupations provided
in the IPUMS datasets. Finally, I construct aggregate state-by-year supply levels by adding
all the individual communication and manual tasks supplied by native workers, weighted by
their hours worked in the previous year. I include individuals between the ages of 18 and
65 who worked a positive number of weeks in the preceding 12 months, were born in the
United States, had at most a high-school degree, and who did not live in group quarters. In
addition, I exclude individuals who reported attending school6. I follow Peri and Sparber
(2009) in cleaning task supplies of demographic characteristics before aggregating them to
the state level. In order to do this, I regress individual communication and manual sup-
plies on dummies for work experience (derived from age), gender, high-school degree, and
race, separately for each year, and weighted by hours worked. I then aggregate the resulting
residuals.
3.4.2 Foreign-born shares and types
Foreign-born shares are defined simply as the number of hours worked by less educated
workers born outside the U.S. divided by the number of hours worked by all less educated
workers in a given state. In order to capture the variation in foreign-born communication
types, I propose six different measures.
5Communication task supply is the average of oral comprehension, oral expression, written comprehension,
and written expression. Manual task supply is the average of arm-hand steadiness, manual dexterity, finger
dexterity, control precision, multilimb coordination, response orientation, rate control, reaction time, wrist-
finger speed, speed of limb movement, extent flexibility, dynamic flexibility, gross body coordination, gross
body equilibrium, static strength, explosive strength, dynamic strength, trunk strength, and stamina.
6Peri and Sparber (2009) do not exclude those individuals. However, most of those who report school
attendance in the data are college or graduate students and should not be considered part of the less educated
labor force.
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3.4.2.1 Foreign-born types measured by language skills
Since 1980, the Census and the ACS have included a question about each household
member’s ability to speak English. I use that question to propose the following mea-
sures of foreign-born communication types: share of the foreign-born who speak English
well/v.well/only and ordinal English ability of the foreign-born. The former is simply the
share of foreign-born individuals in the state who report speaking english well, very well,
or English only. I obtain the latter by recoding the language proficiency question into nu-
merical values according to the following scheme: 0 - does not speak English, 1 - speaks
English but not well, 2 - speaks English well, 3 - speaks English very well, 4 - speaks only
English. I then average those values over the immigrant workers in each state. Table 3.1
reports individual-level summary statistics on the foreign-born’s relative supply of com-
munication to manual tasks (column labeled “C/M ratio”), as well as communication and
manual tasks, individually (columns labeled “Communication” and “Manual”). The data
are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census, and single-year ACS from 2001 to 2019. Panel B
shows that the self-assessed English ability question correlates highly with the foreign-born’s
supply of those tasks. Those who speak English very well or only English work in more
communication-intensive occupations than the foreign-born overall (reported in the second
row of Panel A). In fact, the foreign-born who speak only English work in occupations with
a C/M ratio nearly as high as natives (the first row of Panel A). The differences among the
language ability groups are driven both by higher communication and lower manual supply
of immigrants with higher English proficiency.
There is also evidence in the literature that English proficiency affects immigrants’ com-
munication productivity in the U.S. labor market. For example, Kossoudji (1988) finds that
poor English skills impede migrants’ occupational mobility, suggesting that they may be un-
able to move into more communication-intensive jobs. Bleakley and Chin (2010), show that
English ability reported in the Census predicts a variety of social outcomes of immigrants
and that those with better English skills tend to be more like U.S. natives in terms of divorce
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rates, fertility, and spouse choices. This is particularly important if communication type is
determined not just by language proficiency but by some deeper level of integration into
American society and understanding of American culture.
3.4.2.2 Foreign-born types measured by years since arrival
My second set of foreign-born communication type variables relies on years since arrival
in the United States and includes the following two measures: share of foreign-born who
arrived in the U.S. 21 or more years ago and average years since arrival in the U.S. among
the foreign-born. Panel C of Table 3.1 shows that immigrants who have been in the U.S.
longer tend to perform occupations with higher communication intensities. This is consistent
with the idea of assimilation: as migrants spend time in the United States, they learn
both the language and customs of the native-born population. In economics, the question
of immigrants’ assimilation has been explored in the context of earnings and employment
(Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1989; Antecol et al., 2006). The literature generally finds that
assimilation does occur along this dimension, albeit quite slowly.
3.4.2.3 Foreign-born types measured by country of birth
My final two communication type measures are determined by the immigrants’ coun-
tries of birth: share of foreign-born from countries with English as an official language and
country-specific communication abilities. In order to calculate the share of immigrants born
in countries with English as an official language, I use data on country languages from
Melitz and Toubal (2012, 2014). The country-specific communication abilities measure is
constructed by first regressing each foreign-born’s individual communication task supply on
gender, high-school degree, and dummies for experience, years since arrival, race, year, state,
and country of birth. I interpret the coefficients on dummies for country of birth as measures
of communication productivity associated with migrants from those countries. I then rescale
those coefficients to percentiles and calculate their averages for each state and year. Panel D
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of Table 3.1 shows that an immigrant’s country of birth is strongly correlated with her supply
of communication tasks. Those born in countries with English as an official language hold
occupations with nearly the same communication intensity as U.S.-born natives. It is im-
portant to note that the official language status may proxy for more than just the migrant’s
language skills, such as shared culture, history, or beliefs, all of which would raise the mi-
grant’s communication productivity. In Table 3.1, I also list countries whose migrants have
occupations with the highest and lowest communication intensities in the U.S. labor market
(among those with non-zero numbers of foreign-born in the U.S. in each year of my data).
Not surprisingly, migrants with the highest communication task supplies are those from the
UK, Australia, and two Western European countries with a high prevalence of English as a
second language. Interestingly, those individuals hold occupations with much greater com-
munication intensities than natives, suggesting some kind of selection in migration or hiring
decisions.
Literature which suggests using country of birth as a measure of communication type
includes Bacolod and Rangel (2017), who find that migrants from countries with languages
more similar to English sort into more communication intensive occupations, and de Matos
(2017b), who shows that relative to Eastern European immigrants in Portugal, Brazilian
immigrants (who speak Portugese) perform jobs with more emphasis on language skills.
Note that all my type variables are constructed in such a way that higher values imply
a higher communication type of the foreign-born. Therefore, I expect to find a negative
coefficient on the interaction of the foreign-born share and type. Table 3.2 presents the
summary statistics of all my foreign-born type measures at the state by year level (as used
in the regressions), along with foreign-born shares and the outcome variables, weighted by
the size of the less educated labor force. The mean foreign-born share is 19% but there is
substantial variation across time and states, from 0.51% in 1990 West Virginia to 49.9%
in 2012 California. Likewise, all my type measures vary quite a bit: state-level average
years since arrival are equal to 13.4 at the 10th percentile and 20.8 at the 90th, shares from
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countries with English as an official language are 0.04 at the 10th percentile and 0.22 at the
90th , and the corresponding values for the share who speak English well, very well, or only
English are 0.5 and 0.73.
3.4.3 Instrument for foreign-born shares and types
A concern about estimating equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) with OLS is that there may
be time-varying state-specific demand shocks which simultaneously affect natives’ supply of
tasks, as well as the share and type of the foreign-born locating in that state. Consider a
technological improvement that reduces the demand for manual tasks in a particular state
(e.g. self-driving buses which are only approved in California). Such a change might raise the
relative supply of natives’ communication tasks, while also reducing the number of migrants
choosing to locate in California. It may also affect the type of immigrants who choose to
locate in the state.
In addition, some of my type measures are subject to measurement error. For example,
it has been argued that the self-assessed English-speaking ability reported in the Census
and the ACS is measured with considerable error (Bleakley and Chin, 2004; Dustmann and
Fabbri, 2003). Also, English-speaking ability is potentially a choice variable which may
respond to the relative supply of tasks by natives. Further, the reliability of some measures
may vary over time and with the country of origin, e.g. both Philippines and Canada have
English as an official language but we would expect migrants from those two countries to be
of different communication types in the U.S. labor market.
Therefore, I propose a set of instruments based on historical migration and national
growth rates in the number of immigrants from different countries. First, for each country of
birth represented in the 1980 Census, I calculate the number of migrants from that country
in each state in 1980, keeping only those countries which have a positive number of migrants
in all my sample years (1980, 1990, 2000-2019). I then calculate the changes over time in
the population of migrants from those countries at the national level. Based on the initial
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1980 allocation and the national growth rates, I predict the number of immigrants from each
country residing in each state in all the other years in my sample. Finally, I convert them
to shares of the overall less educated labor force in each state. Thus, I obtain a set of K
instruments7:
f̃kst =
migks,1980 × (1 + gk,t−1980)
natst +
∑K
k=1(migks,1980 × (1 + gk,t−1980))
, (3.5)
where f̃kst is the predicted share of foreign-born from country k in state s and year t;
migks,1980 is the number of migrants from country k in state s in the 1980 Census; gk,t−1980 is
the national growth rate in the number of migrants from country k between years 1980 and
t; natst is the number of natives in state s and year t; and k ∈ {1, ..., K}. This instrument
exploits the fact the immigration is persistent over time, i.e. migrants from a particular
country tend to settle in the same locations as previous migrants from the same country, as
there are strong network effects associated with international migration (Munshi, 2003). It is
valid under the assumption that historical location decisions are not correlated with current
demand shocks. Instruments based on past migration decisions have been used commonly in
immigration literature, going back at least to Altonji and Card (1991). My version is closest
to the ones used by D’Amuri and Peri (2014) and Bisello (2014).
I argue that the set of instruments described in equation (3.5) are correlated both with
the foreign-born shares and all my communication type measures. Due to migrants’ from
the same country concentrating in the same locations over time, predicted shares are highly
correlated with my measures based on country of origin. Similarly, because English-speaking
ability is correlated with the country of origin, historical immigrant mix will be associated
with my language ability-based measures. Finally, the instrument is correlated with measures
based on years since arrival if the mix of migrants coming to the United States changes over
time. For example, in 1980 the United States had a lot of migrants from Italy who arrived
7There are 112 countries in my sample which meet the criterion of non-zero immigrants in all the sample
years. However, in order to avoid problems associated with weak instruments, I only use shares from countries
with the 30 largest populations in the United States in the 2000 Census.
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many years prior and at the same time new migration from Italy was very low, so a state
with a large share of Italian-born immigrants would have a relatively large average years
since arrival value. Conversely, there were relatively few Guatemalan-born individuals in
the U.S. at the time but immigration from Guatemala was rapidly increasing, implying that
a location with a sizable Guatemalan-born population would have fairly low average years
since arrival. Figure 3.1 shows that there have indeed been substantial changes in the mix
of migrants’ countries of origin over my sample period, with the share from countries such
as Canada and Italy declining and the share from some South American and Asian ones on
the rise8.
3.5 Results
Here, I present the results of estimating equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4), using each of my
foreign-born communication type measures, one at a time. Section 3.5.1 includes my OLS
estimates, whereas section 3.5.2 shows estimates using the instrument in equation (3.5). All
models use total less educated employment in the state and year as weights.
3.5.1 OLS results
Table 3.3 shows the results of OLS estimation. In Panel A, the dependent variable
is log aggregate relative task supply by natives, ln(CN/MN); in Panel B, log aggregate
communication task supply by natives, ln(CN); in Panel C, log aggregate manual task supply
by natives, ln(MN). The first column contains a regression without any foreign-born type
measurement, similar to the model estimated by Peri and Sparber (2009). The estimated
coefficient of 0.21 in Panel A implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the foreign-
born share (which would be quite a large change given that the sample mean is 19% with a
standard deviation of 14%) is associated with an increase in natives’ relative communication
8The figure excludes Mexico because the share of Mexican-born migrants in the less educated labor
force dwarves all other countries and makes the figure less readable. The Mexican-born share reached
approximately 10% in the 2000s
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to manual task supply of 2.1% and this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Panels
B and C show that most of that occurs through an increase in the supply of communication
tasks (1.7%, significant at the 5% level), while a smaller part is due to a reduction in the
supply of manual tasks (-0.4%, not significant at conventional levels). Those effects are
smaller and less precisely estimated than the corresponding coefficients in Peri and Sparber
(2009): 3.4% for relative supply, 3.1% for communication supply, and -0.3% for manual
supply. The discrepancy may stem from different samples, as they use the 1960 and 1970
Census but not the ACS, and they do not exclude individuals currently in high school,
college, or graduate school.
The remaining columns show the results of interacting the foreign-born share with one of
my foreign-born communication type measures. The exact measure used in each regression
is identified at the top of each column. The results show that the impact of immigration on
natives’ supply of tasks does depend on the communication type of immigrants. In all models,
the interaction term has the expected, negative sign in regressions of ln(CN/MN) and ln(CN),
and positive sign in regressions of ln(MN). In models (4) and (5), with communication type
measures based on years since arrival, the coefficients on both the foreign-born share and the
interaction are significant at the 1% level. In addition, the interaction is significant at the
10% level in model (6). In each Panel, I also report the results of an F-test of joint significance
of the coefficient on the foreign-born share and its interaction with the foreign-born type.
The test rejects the null of no joint significance with high probability in all models, except
(2) and (3), where the type measures are based on self-reported English ability, a variable
which may suffer from high measurement error, as discussed in section 3.4.3.
In order to aid in the interpretation of the results in Table 3.3, I illustrate how the impact
of immigration on natives’ relative task supply varies with immigrant types in Figure 3.2.
In each graph, the coefficient on the foreign-born share in a regression of ln(CN/MN) (the
y-axis) is plotted against different values of the foreign-born type used in that regression (the
x-axis). The solid black line shows the point estimate, while the solid gray lines mark the 95%
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confidence interval. The dashed red line indicates the sample mean of the communication
type, while the dashed blue lines denote the range of the type found in the sample. The
numbers included in x-axis labels correspond to model numbers in Table 3.3. Table 3.3 and
Figure 3.2 show that in model (2) a 10 percentage point increase in the foreign-born share
is correlated with a 3.6% increase in natives’ relative communication to manual task supply
if all the foreign-born do not speak English well or at all. The effect declines as a larger
share of immigrants speak English well, very well, or only English, reaching nearly 0 at the
maximum value of this communication type. Note, however, that the effect is generally not
statistically significant over the distribution of the communication type. Model (3) implies
that a 10 percentage point increase in the foreign-born share is correlated with a 4% increase
in natives’ relative task supply if the foreign-born’s average English ability is 0, i.e. they
do not speak English at all. The effect declines to 2.8% if the foreign-born’s English ability
rises by 1, equal to about 3 times the standard deviation in the sample. Again, zero is in
the 95% confidence over almost the entire distribution of this type measure.
Models (4) and (5) suggest that migrants’ tenure in the United States (i.e. average years
since arrival) is important in determining their impact on natives’ relative task supply. The
coefficients from equation (4) imply that natives raise their relative task supply by 5.3% in
response to a 10 percentage point increase in the foreign-born share if the foreign-born are
brand new arrivals, i.e. their years since arrival are zero. The effect declines by 0.2% for each
additional year since arrival, reaching zero at about 27 years, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Taken literally, this would suggest that immigrants have the same communication to manual
productivity as natives after spending 27 years in the United States. The importance of
migrants’ U.S. tenure in their communication productivity is confirmed by model (5) which
suggests that a larger share of long-term immigrants (those who have lived in the U.S. for
21 years or longer) dampens natives’ relative task supply response to immigration. This
response starts at a 3.6% increase in relative supply due to a 10 percentage point rise in the
foreign-born share if none of the migrants have lived in the U.S. for more than 21 years, to 0
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once three-quarters are long-term migrants. The effect of years since arrival on the impact of
immigration, which is estimated more precisely than the effect of language abilities, suggests
that language skills are not the only ones necessary for high communication productivity
in the less educated U.S. labor market. Rather, migrants acquire knowledge of the U.S.
culture, customs, and ways of interacting, as they spend time in the country. In addition,
my result might explain why Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011) find a much larger
effect of immigration on natives’ relative task supply in Spain than Peri and Sparber (2009)
in the U.S., even though about half the immigrants in their sample are from Spanish-speaking
countries. Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011) limit their analysis to immigrants who
have been in Spain for five years or fewer, who, according to my estimates, would have the
largest impact on natives’ communication and manual task supply.
Finally, models (6) and (7) show that the foreign-born’s countries of origin may also affect
how natives adjust their relative task supply as a consequence of immigration. The coeffi-
cient in model (6) implies that if all immigrants are from countries which supply the lowest
communication productivity in the U.S. labor market, natives increase their communication
to manual task ratio by 9.4% in response to a 10 percentage point increase in the foreign-born
share. That effect declines to 3.2% if all the migrants are from a median communication
type country and may even become negative with high communication productivity coun-
tries (although the confidence interval is very wide, due to a small number observations in
that range). Finally, in model (7), natives raise their relative supply by 2.7% due to a 10
percentage point rise in foreign-born share if no migrants are from countries with English
as an official language and the effect declines with more immigration from English-speaking
countries. However, note that the effect over most of the type domain is very imprecisely
estimated.
Taken together, these results suggest that the type of immigrants who locate in a particu-
lar labor market is important in determining the natives’ relative task supply response, with
a higher foreign-born communication type dampening that response. In appendix Figure C.1
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and Figure C.2, I present similar plots to those in Figure 3.2, separately for communication
and manual tasks. The results are similar: lower foreign-born communication type raises
natives’ communication task supply response to immigration and lowers their manual task
supply response.
3.5.2 IV results
In this section, I present results from an instrumental variables estimation, using my set
of instruments explained in section 3.4.3. Appendix Table C.1 presents the results of tests
for weak instruments in the first stage. In Panel A, I present F-test statistics adjusted for
multiple testing, based on Angrist and Pischke (2009). In Panel B, I report the Kleibergen-
Paap F-statistics (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006), which are a version of the Cragg-Donald
F-statistics (Cragg and Donald, 1993) for non-i.i.d. error terms (Christopher F. Baum and
Mark E. Schaffer and Steven Stillman, 2015; Frank Kleibergen and Mark E. Schaffer and
Frank Windmeijer, 2007). Based on the critical values for 3 endogenous variables and 30
instruments, reported in Stock and Yogo (2002) (see their Table 1), my instruments are not
weak in any regression.
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3 show the results of the IV estimation in the same layout as Table
3.3 and Figure 3.2. There are only minor differences from the OLS findings. The coefficient
in model (1), without a type measure, is no longer statistically significant in any of the three
regressions. The coefficients on foreign-born shares in Panel A and Panel B are slightly larger
in models (2), (3), (6), (7), and slightly smaller in models (4), (5). The reverse is true for
Panel C. Figure 3.3 shows the same patterns of interactions with measures of communication
types, although the confidence intervals are generally wider for all measures. Thus, the IV
results confirm my analysis from section 3.5.1. For completeness, appendix Figure C.3 and
Figure C.4 present separate graphs of natives’ communication and manual task supplies over
ranges of communication types.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have built on the theoretical model and empirical approach developed
by Peri and Sparber (2009) in order to estimate how the impact of immigration on natives’
supply of communication and manual tasks varies with the immigrants’ communication pro-
ductivity. I have proposed six different variables which I argue are plausible measures to
capture the foreign-born’s communication type, derived from their language skills, years of
residence in the U.S., and countries of origin. Using regressions at the state and year level,
I have shown that natives’ adjustment of relative task supply is muted as the foreign-born’s
communication productivity increases. My results are confirmed by instrumental variables
estimation, using an instrument based on historical settlement patterns by immigrants from
different countries. In particular, years since arrival in the United States appear to be
particularly important in determining migrants’ communication productivity, more so than
language ability-based measures. This finding suggests that communication productivity
is a multidimensional skill developed over time, rather than a simple function of English
proficiency. It is worth exploring further how migrants’ acquisition of communication skills
evolves over their stay in the U.S. and how it interacts with occupational sorting by U.S.-born
natives.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of communication and manual tasks supplied by natives and dif-
ferent types of foreign-born.
C/M ratio Communication Manual
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Natives vs. foreign-born
Natives 18256463 1.66 1.69 0.52 0.27 0.51 0.23
Foreign-born 2461470 1.01 1.27 0.40 0.25 0.58 0.20
Panel B: English ability
Does not speak English 307647 0.57 0.78 0.28 0.21 0.65 0.17
Speaks English, but not well 686997 0.71 0.90 0.34 0.22 0.62 0.18
Speaks English well 632918 1.01 1.20 0.41 0.25 0.58 0.20
Speaks English very well 545409 1.44 1.55 0.49 0.26 0.53 0.22
Speaks only English 317210 1.57 1.64 0.52 0.26 0.52 0.22
Panel C: Years since arrival
0-5 years 362647 0.79 1.06 0.35 0.23 0.61 0.19
6-10 years 399545 0.84 1.07 0.37 0.24 0.60 0.19
11-15 years 405404 0.92 1.16 0.38 0.25 0.59 0.19
16-20 years 382305 1.01 1.25 0.40 0.25 0.58 0.20
21+ years 940280 1.22 1.44 0.44 0.26 0.56 0.21
Panel D: Country of origin
English is official language
No 2125094 0.94 1.21 0.38 0.25 0.59 0.20
Yes 303795 1.58 1.58 0.54 0.26 0.51 0.21
Top 5 C/M ratios
UK, ns 7158 2.57 1.98 0.64 0.25 0.39 0.22
Australia 2779 2.42 1.88 0.64 0.25 0.41 0.22
Belgium 1252 2.34 1.91 0.61 0.25 0.41 0.21
Sweden 1502 2.32 1.86 0.62 0.24 0.41 0.21
England 19988 2.31 1.89 0.62 0.25 0.42 0.23
Bottom 5 C/M ratios
Myanmar 4174 0.90 1.07 0.39 0.23 0.58 0.17
El Salvador 109006 0.84 1.10 0.36 0.24 0.60 0.19
Honduras 36128 0.76 1.07 0.33 0.23 0.61 0.19
Mexico 1065231 0.76 1.03 0.34 0.24 0.63 0.19
Guatemala 66810 0.72 1.00 0.33 0.23 0.62 0.18
Individual-level IPUMS data from Census 1980, 1990, 2000, and ACS 2001-2019. Official language from (Melitz and
Toubal, 2012, 2014).
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Panel A: Natives’ cleaned task supplies
C/M ratio 0.42 0.05 0.36 0.48
Communication 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.33
Manual 0.69 0.02 0.67 0.72
Ln(C/M ratio) -0.87 0.12 -1.03 -0.72
Ln(communication) -1.23 0.09 -1.36 -1.12
Ln(manual) -0.36 0.03 -0.40 -0.33
Panel B: Foreign-born share and foreign-born types.
Foreign-born share 0.19 0.14 0.04 0.45
Share who speak English well/v.well/only 0.61 0.10 0.50 0.73
Ordinal English ability 2.00 0.32 1.65 2.34
Years since arrival in the U.S. 17.29 2.93 13.38 20.79
Share who arrived in the U.S. 21+ years ago 0.35 0.10 0.21 0.48
Country-specific communication abilities 0.63 0.09 0.52 0.75
Share from countries with English as official language 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.22
Notes.
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Table 3.3: Natives’ communication and manual task supply, foreign-born shares and types. OLS
estimates.































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Dependent variable - ln(CN/MN )
Foreign-born share 0.21∗∗ 0.36 0.40∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.23) (0.23) (0.09) (0.10) (0.33) (0.07)
Foreign-born type 0.01 -0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.05
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Foreign-born share×type -0.34 -0.12 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -1.24∗ -0.76
(0.38) (0.12) (0.00) (0.07) (0.68) (0.60)
Joint sig. of share + share×type:
F 2.39 2.67 51.80 32.91 14.60 10.78
p-value 0.102 0.079 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122
Panel B: Dependent variable - ln(CN )
Foreign-born share 0.17∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.32∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.17) (0.17) (0.06) (0.07) (0.24) (0.06)
Foreign-born type 0.01 -0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.03∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Foreign-born share×type -0.30 -0.10 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.97∗ -0.51
(0.28) (0.09) (0.00) (0.07) (0.48) (0.42)
Joint sig. of share + share×type:
F 2.79 3.11 47.15 31.09 14.66 10.17
p-value 0.071 0.054 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122
Panel C: Dependent variable - ln(MN )
Foreign-born share -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.20∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02)
Foreign-born type -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Foreign-born share×type 0.04 0.02 0.00∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.27 0.25
(0.11) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.21) (0.19)
Joint sig. of share + share×type:
F 1.13 1.24 12.60 11.10 9.24 7.59
p-value 0.331 0.299 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001
N 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122
Notes. Notes All regressions estimated with OLS and weighted by total employment of less educated workers in
the state and year. Standard errors clustered at the state level. All models include state and year fixed effects.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of the foreign-born share on natives’ aggregate relative supply of communication
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Table 3.4: Natives’ communication and manual task supply, foreign-born shares and types. IV
estimates.































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Dependent variable - ln(CN/MN )
Foreign-born share 0.13 0.55 0.64∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.21 1.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.14) (0.39) (0.33) (0.13) (0.16) (0.25) (0.11)
Foreign-born type 0.09 -0.01 0.01∗∗ 0.12 -0.37∗∗ -0.18
(0.09) (0.03) (0.00) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13)
Foreign-born share×type -1.08 -0.32∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -1.74∗∗∗ -1.03
(0.67) (0.17) (0.00) (0.13) (0.52) (0.66)
Joint sig. of share + share×type:
Chi2 2.66 4.04 62.63 30.92 30.26 13.22
p-value 0.265 0.133 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001
N 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122
Panel B: Dependent variable - ln(CN )
Foreign-born share 0.11 0.41 0.47∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.14 0.97∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.10) (0.30) (0.26) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09)
Foreign-born type 0.10 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.11∗ -0.23∗ -0.11
(0.08) (0.03) (0.00) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10)
Foreign-born share×type -0.85∗ -0.25∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -0.77
(0.51) (0.13) (0.00) (0.10) (0.34) (0.48)
Joint sig. of share + share×type:
Chi2 2.93 3.82 59.11 33.22 34.13 10.59
p-value 0.231 0.148 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.005
N 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122
Panel C: Dependent variable - ln(MN )
Foreign-born share -0.03 -0.14 -0.18∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.02)
Foreign-born type 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Foreign-born share×type 0.24 0.08 0.00∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.26
(0.19) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04) (0.20) (0.19)
Joint sig. of share + share×type:
Chi2 2.05 4.86 26.36 14.92 20.97 17.80
p-value 0.358 0.088 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122
Notes. All regressions estimated with 2SLS and weighted by total employment of less educated workers in the state
and year. Standard errors clustered at the state level. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance
levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. 118
Figure 3.3: Effect of the foreign-born share on natives’ aggregate relative supply of communication
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Table A.1: List of current members of the EU and EFTA.
Country Year joined Country Year joined
European Union
Belgium 1958 Cyprus 2004
France 1958 Czechia 2004
Germany 1958 Estonia 2004
Italy 1958 Hungary 2004
Luxembourg 1958 Latvia 2004
Netherlands 1958 Lithuania 2004
Denmark 1973 Malta 2004
Ireland 1973 Poland 2004
Greece 1981 Slovakia 2004
Portugal 1986 Slovenia 2004
Spain 1986 Bulgaria 2007
Austria 1995 Romania 2007
Finland 1995 Croatia 2013
Sweden 1995
European Free Trade Association
Norway 1960 Iceland 1970
Switzerland 1960 Liechtenstein 1991
Notes. Data obtained from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries en#tab-0-1 and
https://www.efta.int/About-EFTA/EFTA-through-years-747, accessed November 13th, 2020.
121























































































































India 5292 10.93% Romania 533 1.10%
Poland 4308 8.90% China 481 0.99%
Ireland 3539 7.31% Slovakia 419 0.87%
Germany 2870 5.93% Netherlands 415 0.86%
South Africa 2131 4.40% Mauritius 381 0.79%
Pakistan 1879 3.88% Turkey 375 0.77%
Kenya 1410 2.91% Iran 366 0.76%
United States 1300 2.69% Hungary 364 0.75%
Philippines 1253 2.59% Tanzania 357 0.74%
Nigeria 1161 2.40% Latvia 356 0.74%
France 1114 2.30% Zambia 331 0.68%
Bangladesh 1001 2.07% Malta 325 0.67%
Sri Lanka 975 2.01% Brazil 291 0.60%
Jamaica 957 1.98% Nepal 276 0.57%
Italy 911 1.88% Greece 261 0.54%
Portugal 800 1.65% Trinidad and Tobago 230 0.48%
Canada 797 1.65% Bulgaria 224 0.46%
Ghana 793 1.64% Japan 224 0.46%
Spain 704 1.45% Russia 221 0.46%
Lithuania 677 1.40% Egypt 213 0.44%
Hong Kong 670 1.38% Sweden 210 0.43%
Cyprus 553 1.14% Czechia 210 0.43%
Uganda 551 1.14% Belgium 208 0.43%
Singapore 538 1.11% Thailand 192 0.40%
Malaysia 536 1.11% Other 4055 8.38%
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A.1 Weighted regressions
In this section, I present versions of my main results with LFS person weights.
Table A.3: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates, weighted.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) -0.070∗ -0.086∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.029) (0.024) (0.021)
Years since arrival 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
(Years since arrival)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.074∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.413∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.029) (0.029)
Married -0.025 -0.029 -0.032
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Less educated -0.424∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.093
(0.063)
Ln(trade with the UK) 0.014
(0.020)
Polity 2 score 0.000
(0.003)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.002
(0.004)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.001
(0.003)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.001
(0.002)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes
N 48417 47701 47701 38742
R2 0.118 0.278 0.350 0.344
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. All regressions
estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, year, and industry of employment level.
All models weighted by LFS person weights. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table A.4: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates, weighted.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) 0.076 0.013 -0.030 -0.056 -0.098∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.116) (0.124) (0.180) (0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028)
Years since arrival 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.009∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
(Years since arrival)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.085∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.420∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.043) (0.051) (0.047) (0.031) (0.033)
Married 0.006 -0.000 -0.007 -0.034 -0.034∗ -0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021)
Less educated -0.354∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.039) (0.045) (0.054)
Ln(real GDP per capita) 0.072 0.018
(0.099) (0.078)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.006 0.009
(0.055) (0.021)
Polity 2 score 0.039 0.002
(0.059) (0.003)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.010 0.002
(0.018) (0.005)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.001 -0.002
(0.008) (0.006)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Ln(real exrate) difference 0.175 0.110 0.064 0.029
(0.175) (0.128) (0.133) (0.203)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 19103 18851 18851 15123 29314 28850 28850 23619
N 48417 47701 47701 38742 48417 47701 47701 38742
R2 0.124 0.287 0.363 0.358 0.124 0.287 0.363 0.358
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. All regressions
estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, year, and industry of employment level.
All models weighted with LFS person weights. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Ln(actual hours in both jobs, incl. OT) 0.040 0.074 -0.022∗ -0.031 0.062 0.106
(0.105) (0.111) (0.012) (0.019) (0.109) (0.126)
Ln(actual hours in main job, incl. OT) 0.047 0.072 -0.024∗∗ -0.038∗∗ 0.071 0.110
(0.114) (0.117) (0.011) (0.017) (0.118) (0.125)
Ln(actual hours in main job, excl. OT) 0.074 0.101 -0.022∗∗ -0.034∗ 0.096 0.135
(0.105) (0.113) (0.010) (0.019) (0.109) (0.122)
Worked OT -0.067 -0.093 0.004 0.004 -0.071 -0.097
(0.060) (0.062) (0.014) (0.015) (0.062) (0.065)
Has a second job -0.000 0.015 0.008 0.013 -0.009 0.001
(0.017) (0.024) (0.005) (0.009) (0.021) (0.031)
Is looking for a new job -0.025∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.013 -0.000
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.013) (0.027) (0.031)
Is looking for an additional job -0.003 0.025 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗ 0.016 0.057
(0.007) (0.037) (0.004) (0.013) (0.026) (0.044)
Would like to work more 0.009 -0.002 -0.007 -0.027 0.016∗∗ 0.025
(0.010) (0.036) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.050)
Notes. The dependent variable is indicated in the first column. Would like to work more is a union of two questions:
the migrant is looking for an additional job, the migrant would like to work more hours at the current wage rate. Only
regression models (3) and (4) from table 1.3 are presented. The last two columns show the difference in coefficients
between EU and non-EU migrants. All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country
of birth, year, and industry of employment level. All models weighted with LFS person weights. Significance levels:
* 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table A.6: Attrition from the survey and real exchange rates, weighted.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate over next 12 mos.) 0.309 0.382∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.421∗∗ -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.205) (0.138) (0.134) (0.150) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Years since arrival -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Years since arrival)2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.028∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.033∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Married -0.051∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
Less educated 0.024∗∗ 0.020 0.013 0.019∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.014
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.055 0.031
(0.132) (0.067)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.045 -0.001
(0.060) (0.024)
Polity 2 score 0.051∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.015) (0.002)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.003)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.005 -0.003
(0.006) (0.004)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.006∗∗ -0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
Ln(exrate) difference 0.318 0.383** 0.385** 0.423**
(0.207) (0.140) (0.137) (0.152)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Attrition in sub-sample 0.456 0.455 0.455 0.451 0.447 0.446 0.446 0.439
N (sub-sample) 17492 17358 17358 15114 27461 27135 27135 23590
N 44953 44493 44493 38704 44953 44493 44493 38704
R2 0.054 0.095 0.097 0.101 0.054 0.095 0.097 0.101
Notes. The dependent variable is individual-level attrition from the LFS. It is equal to 0 if the migrant is observed
in both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS and 1 if they are observed only in wave 1. All regressions estimated with OLS,
with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, year, and industry of employment level. All models weighted
by LFS person weights. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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A.2 Alternative classifiction of Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia
In this section, I show versions of my main results where I classifiy Bulgaria and Romania
as EU countries in 2014 instead of 2007, and Croatia as a non-EU country.
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Table A.7: Total earnings from employment and real exchange rates. Alternative EU classification
of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate) 0.103 0.034 -0.012 -0.041 -0.099∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.132) (0.133) (0.182) (0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027)
Years since arrival 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
(Years since arrival)2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.089∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.445∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.053) (0.045) (0.029) (0.029)
Married -0.007 -0.013 -0.021 -0.042∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.040∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017)
Less educated -0.361∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.038) (0.041) (0.054)
Ln(real GDP per capita) 0.035 0.017
(0.112) (0.075)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.007 0.014
(0.058) (0.024)
Polity 2 score 0.035 0.002
(0.054) (0.004)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) 0.016 0.001
(0.019) (0.005)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Ln(people affected by disasters) -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Ln(real exrate) difference 0.202 0.130 0.079 0.042
(0.188) (0.145) (0.145) (0.207)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N (sub-sample) 18864 18614 18614 14893 29553 29087 29087 23849
N 48417 47701 47701 38742 48417 47701 47701 38742
R2 0.116 0.286 0.356 0.353 0.116 0.286 0.356 0.353
Notes. The dependent variable is log gross weekly earnings from one or two (if applicable) jobs. All regressions
estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, year, and industry of employment level.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
129
Table A.8: Channels of earnings adjustment and real exchange rates. Alternative EU classification






(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Ln(actual hours in both jobs, incl. OT) 0.089 0.106 -0.018∗ -0.028 0.107 0.134
(0.099) (0.109) (0.010) (0.017) (0.104) (0.124)
Ln(actual hours in main job, incl. OT) 0.098 0.110 -0.020∗ -0.035∗ 0.119 0.145
(0.109) (0.113) (0.010) (0.017) (0.113) (0.122)
Ln(actual hours in main job, excl. OT) 0.115 0.126 -0.018∗ -0.031∗ 0.133 0.157
(0.101) (0.109) (0.009) (0.017) (0.105) (0.118)
Worked OT -0.048 -0.108 0.006 0.003 -0.054 -0.111
(0.076) (0.073) (0.015) (0.016) (0.076) (0.074)
Has a second job 0.008 0.009 0.009∗ 0.013∗ -0.001 -0.005
(0.022) (0.027) (0.005) (0.008) (0.027) (0.034)
Is looking for a new job -0.023∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.012 -0.026∗ -0.011 -0.011
(0.005) (0.023) (0.007) (0.013) (0.032) (0.033)
Is looking for an additional job -0.006 0.008 -0.018∗∗ -0.032∗∗ 0.012 0.040
(0.016) (0.034) (0.008) (0.014) (0.032) (0.037)
Would like to work more -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.029 0.006 0.025
(0.010) (0.036) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.053)
Notes. The dependent variable is indicated in the first column. Would like to work more is a union of two questions:
the migrant is looking for an additional job, the migrant would like to work more hours at the current wage rate. Only
regression models (3) and (4) from table 1.3 are presented. The last two columns show the difference in coefficients
between EU and non-EU migrants. All regressions estimated with OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country
of birth, year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table A.9: Attrition from the survey and real exchange rates. Alternative EU classification of
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.
EU/EFTA countries Non-EU/EFTA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(real exrate over next 12 mos.) 0.403∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008
(0.181) (0.135) (0.133) (0.158) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Years since arrival -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Years since arrival)2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.023∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.035∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Married -0.047∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Less educated 0.024∗∗ 0.018 0.012 0.024∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.018∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Ln(real GDP per capita) -0.063 0.028
(0.132) (0.067)
Ln(trade with the UK) -0.047 -0.001
(0.061) (0.027)
Polity 2 score 0.043∗∗ 0.002
(0.015) (0.002)
Ln(deaths in conflicts) -0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.003)
Ln(deaths in disasters) -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.003)
Ln(people affected by disasters) 0.005∗ -0.000
(0.003) (0.001)
Ln(exrate) difference 0.414** 0.467*** 0.470*** 0.503***
(0.184) (0.139) (0.136) (0.160)
Country of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry of work FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Attrition in sub-sample 0.454 0.453 0.453 0.449 0.448 0.447 0.447 0.441
N (sub-sample) 17255 17123 17123 14884 27698 27370 27370 23820
N 44953 44493 44493 38704 44953 44493 44493 38704
R2 0.056 0.094 0.096 0.099 0.056 0.094 0.096 0.099
Notes. The dependent variable is individual-level attrition from the LFS. It is equal to 0 if the migrant is observed
in both waves 1 and 5 of the LFS and 1 if they are observed only in wave 1. All regressions estimated with OLS,
with standard errors clustered at the country of birth, year, and industry of employment level. Significance levels: *





B.1 Robustness: Subsetting Based on Legal Status
Table B.1: Annual new hires: subsetting based on legal status.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. MoAs only (12-month event window)
Treated × post-treatment -0.078 -0.060 -0.031 -0.053 -0.024
(0.153) (0.186) (0.142) (0.145) (0.271)
N 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461
B. First treaty only
Treated × post-treatment 0.111 0.192 0.161 0.098 0.179
(0.228) (0.228) (0.218) (0.233) (0.227)
N 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215
C. After RA-8042 only (6/22/1995)
Treated × post-treatment 0.015 0.031 0.148 -0.009 0.013
(0.184) (0.172) (0.185) (0.183) (0.171)
N 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215
D. Before RA-10022 only (3/25/2010)
Treated × post-treatment -0.078 -0.066 0.019 -0.101 -0.113
(0.127) (0.194) (0.137) (0.140) (0.186)
N 3388 3388 3388 3388 3388
E. After RA-10022 only (3/25/2010)
Treated × post-treatment 0.294 0.315 0.565 0.285 0.355
(0.336) (0.426) (0.451) (0.343) (0.430)
N 1876 1876 1876 1876 1876
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, and year levels, are in paren-
theses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5%
*** 1%.
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Table B.2: Monthly remittances: differences in legal status.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. MoAs only (12-month event window)
Treated × post-treatment -0.301 -0.370∗ -0.280 -0.304 -0.315
(0.162) (0.176) (0.175) (0.161) (0.171)
N 12925 12925 12925 12925 12925
B. First treaty only
Treated × post-treatment 0.059 0.071 0.168 0.010 0.027
(0.193) (0.206) (0.191) (0.207) (0.210)
N 35843 35843 35843 35843 35843
C. After RA-8042 only (6/22/1995)
Treated × post-treatment 0.038 -0.001 0.101 -0.004 -0.015
(0.165) (0.171) (0.159) (0.176) (0.174)
N 55115 55115 55115 55115 55115
D. Before RA-10022 only (3/25/2010)
Treated × post-treatment 0.244 0.185 0.270 0.155 0.092
(0.228) (0.251) (0.237) (0.269) (0.296)
N 23871 23871 23871 23871 23871
E. After RA-10022 only (3/25/2010)
Treated × post-treatment -0.194 -0.188 -0.125 -0.224 -0.185
(0.186) (0.183) (0.221) (0.181) (0.189)
N 31463 31463 31463 31463 31463
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, year, and month levels, are in
parentheses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% **
5% *** 1%.
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B.2 Robustness: Subsetting Based on Geography
Table B.3: Annual new hires: subsetting based on geography.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. OFCs excluded
Treated × post-treatment -0.009 0.002 0.091 -0.029 -0.015
(0.206) (0.198) (0.206) (0.204) (0.203)
N 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102
B. Asia only
Treated × post-treatment -0.164 -0.113 -0.097 -0.206 -0.115
(0.137) (0.166) (0.146) (0.189) (0.185)
N 1295 1295 1295 1295 1295
C. MENA excluded
Treated × post-treatment 0.029 0.099 0.095 0.055 0.108
(0.347) (0.320) (0.324) (0.336) (0.321)
N 2226 2226 2226 2226 2226
D. MENA only
Treated × post-treatment 0.042 0.068 0.091 -0.051 0.064
(0.164) (0.123) (0.178) (0.126) (0.137)
N 455 455 455 455 455
E. COW, HK, CNMI only
Treated × post-treatment 0.015 0.031 0.148 -0.009 0.013
(0.184) (0.172) (0.185) (0.183) (0.171)
N 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, and year levels, are in paren-
theses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5%
*** 1%.
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Table B.4: Monthly remittances: subsetting based on geography.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. OFCs excluded
Treated × post-treatment -0.057 -0.093 -0.002 -0.116 -0.116
(0.143) (0.163) (0.137) (0.148) (0.164)
N 38617 38617 38617 38617 38617
B. Asia only
Treated × post-treatment 0.098 0.136 0.125 0.111 0.207
(0.212) (0.227) (0.217) (0.222) (0.224)
N 13505 13505 13505 13505 13505
C. MENA excluded
Treated × post-treatment -0.125 -0.062 -0.057 -0.131 -0.078
(0.209) (0.221) (0.236) (0.216) (0.236)
N 28178 28178 28178 28178 28178
D. MENA only
Treated × post-treatment 0.303 0.265 0.296 0.293 0.230
(0.242) (0.243) (0.240) (0.265) (0.244)
N 3796 3796 3796 3796 3796
E. COW, HK, CNMI only
Treated × post-treatment 0.038 -0.001 0.101 -0.004 -0.015
(0.165) (0.171) (0.159) (0.176) (0.174)
N 55115 55115 55115 55115 55115
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, year, and month levels, are in
parentheses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% **
5% *** 1%.
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B.3 Robustness: Subsetting Based on Type of Country
Table B.5: Annual new hires: subsetting based on type of country.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Zero deployment countries excluded
Treated × post-treatment 0.015 0.031 0.148 -0.009 0.013
(0.184) (0.172) (0.185) (0.183) (0.171)
N 5215 5215 5215 5215 5215
B. Low Polity 2 (<7) only
Treated × post-treatment -0.137 -0.120 -0.053 -0.150∗ -0.122
(0.080) (0.105) (0.097) (0.080) (0.116)
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 1589
C. High Polity 2 (>=7) only
Treated × post-treatment -0.042 0.158 0.168 -0.066 0.131
(0.333) (0.287) (0.324) (0.300) (0.290)
N 1206 1206 1206 1206 1206
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, and year levels, are in paren-
theses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5%
*** 1%.
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Table B.6: Monthly remittances: subsetting based on type of country.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Zero deployment countries excluded
Treated × post-treatment 0.038 -0.001 0.101 -0.004 -0.015
(0.165) (0.171) (0.159) (0.176) (0.174)
N 55115 55115 55115 55115 55115
B. Low Polity 2 (<7) only
Treated × post-treatment -0.006 -0.053 -0.031 -0.009 -0.024
(0.308) (0.320) (0.304) (0.327) (0.364)
N 11282 11282 11282 11282 11282
C. High Polity 2 (>=7) only
Treated × post-treatment 0.105 0.227 0.174 0.119 0.231
(0.211) (0.184) (0.194) (0.214) (0.219)
N 18036 18036 18036 18036 18036
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, year, and month levels, are in
parentheses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% **
5% *** 1%.
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B.4 Robustness: Alternative Treatment of the United States
Table B.7: Annual new hires: alternative treatment of the United States.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. U.S. excluded (event study)
Treated × post-treatment 0.006 0.027 0.128 -0.017 0.008
(0.185) (0.173) (0.184) (0.185) (0.173)
N 5117 5117 5117 5117 5117
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. U.S. recoded (OLS panel)
Signed BLA 0.277 0.330 0.435 0.277 0.341
(0.389) (0.371) (0.407) (0.403) (0.398)
N 2694 2694 2694 2694 2694
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. For the event study, standard errors were clustered at the event, host country, and
year levels; for the OLS panel standard errors were clustered at the host country, and year levels. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: *
10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table B.8: Monthly remittances: alternative treatment of the United States.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. U.S. excluded (event study)
Treated × post-treatment 0.026 -0.008 0.086 -0.013 -0.020
(0.165) (0.171) (0.159) (0.176) (0.174)
N 53728 53728 53728 53728 53728
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. U.S. recoded (OLS panel)
Signed BLA -0.309 -0.175 0.015 -0.329 -0.172
(0.548) (0.544) (0.531) (0.569) (0.551)
N 36972 36972 36972 36972 36972
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. For the event study, standard errors were clustered at the event, host country,
year, and month levels; for the OLS panel standard errors were clustered at the host country, year, and month
levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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B.5 Robustness: Alternative Event Window
Table B.9: Annual new hires: alternative event windows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Event Window – 1 year
Treated × post-treatment -0.020 0.019 0.026 -0.034 0.006
(0.080) (0.090) (0.082) (0.078) (0.085)
N 5976 5976 5976 5976 5976
B. Event Window – 2 years
Treated × post-treatment 0.074 0.093 0.176 0.060 0.090
(0.188) (0.190) (0.202) (0.190) (0.193)
N 5560 5560 5560 5560 5560
C. Event Window – 4 years
Treated × post-treatment -0.193 -0.236 0.052 -0.239 -0.256
(0.259) (0.304) (0.318) (0.264) (0.310)
N 3609 3609 3609 3609 3609
D. Event Window – 4 years
Treated × post-treatment -0.226 -0.312 0.272 -0.269 -0.226
(0.356) (0.462) (0.496) (0.356) (0.489)
N 2981 2981 2981 2981 2981
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, and year levels, are in paren-
theses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5%
*** 1%.
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Table B.10: Monthly remittances: alternative event windows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Event Window – 12 months
Treated × post-treatment -0.058 -0.075 -0.049 -0.063 -0.069
(0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079)
N 50575 50575 50575 50575 50575
B. Event Window – 24 months
Treated × post-treatment -0.001 -0.054 0.033 -0.022 -0.056
(0.113) (0.116) (0.110) (0.117) (0.115)
N 47775 47775 47775 47775 47775
C. Event Window – 48 months
Treated × post-treatment 0.044 -0.050 0.130 -0.037 -0.071
(0.207) (0.227) (0.189) (0.210) (0.230)
N 39673 39673 39673 39673 39673
D. Event Window – 60 months
Treated × post-treatment 0.173 0.109 0.498 0.025 0.073
(0.221) (0.295) (0.313) (0.218) (0.295)
N 35695 35695 35695 35695 35695
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, year, and month levels, are in
parentheses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% **
5% *** 1%.
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B.6 Robustness: Annual Remittance Data
Table B.11: Remmitances: annual data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Event Window – 1 year
Treated × post-treatment -0.116 -0.121 -0.089 -0.093 -0.099
(0.085) (0.077) (0.076) (0.083) (0.087)
N 7908 7908 7908 7908 7908
B. Event Window – 2 years
Treated × post-treatment -0.123 -0.191 -0.088 -0.129 -0.201
(0.125) (0.130) (0.123) (0.119) (0.123)
N 7685 7685 7685 7685 7685
C. Event Window – 3 years
Treated × post-treatment -0.033 -0.073 0.089 -0.012 -0.049
(0.142) (0.156) (0.117) (0.135) (0.139)
N 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099
D. Event Window – 4 years
Treated × post-treatment -0.061 -0.119 0.164∗ -0.046 -0.072
(0.143) (0.184) (0.085) (0.151) (0.183)
N 6453 6453 6453 6453 6453
E. Event Window – 5 years
Treated × post-treatment -0.047 -0.105 0.484 -0.046 0.063
(0.141) (0.240) (0.322) (0.153) (0.265)
N 6083 6083 6083 6083 6083
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, and year levels, are in paren-
theses. Sample size is reported in the third row of each alternative specification. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5%
*** 1%.
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B.7 Robustness: Relaxing the Constant Sample Restriction
Table B.12: Annual new hires: relaxing the constant sample restriction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated × post-treatment -0.025 -0.026 0.074 0.071 0.056
(0.175) (0.165) (0.178) (0.174) (0.177)
N 12334 9438 9438 9177 8284
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, year and month level, are in
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
Table B.13: Monthly remittances: relaxing the constant sample restriction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated × post-treatment -0.026 -0.100 -0.030 0.006 -0.072
(0.139) (0.161) (0.172) (0.154) (0.162)
N 84461 68725 68725 73824 67930
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the event, host country, year and month level, are in
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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B.8 Robustness: Panel Regressions
Table B.14: Log new hires - all sectors. Panel data model - OLS Regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signed BLA in the past 0.277 0.330 0.435 0.277 0.341
(0.389) (0.371) (0.407) (0.403) (0.398)
Ln(GDP per capita of host) 2.889∗∗∗ 1.750∗
(0.842) (0.904)
Ln(population of host) 3.817∗ 5.256∗
(1.973) (2.553)
Polity2 of host -0.001 -0.016
(0.027) (0.024)
GDP per capita ratio (host to PHL) 0.387∗∗ 0.284
(0.168) (0.185)
Higher Polity Score in PHL -0.373 -0.430∗
(0.261) (0.236)
Ln(total trade) 0.049 0.029
(0.041) (0.042)
BIT in the past -0.130 -0.233
(0.371) (0.395)
Ideological difference -0.254 -0.196
(0.271) (0.265)
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2694 2694 2694 2694 2694
R2 0.889 0.893 0.892 0.889 0.894
Note: All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the host country and year level, are in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table B.15: Total new hires: all workers. Panel data model - PPML Regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signed BLA in the past -0.018 0.104 -0.041 -0.023 0.088
(0.242) (0.321) (0.266) (0.229) (0.353)
Ln(GDP per capita of host) 2.596∗ 3.376∗∗∗
(1.351) (1.236)
Ln(population of host) 5.254∗∗∗ 4.612∗∗∗
(1.977) (1.404)
Polity2 of host 0.004 0.006
(0.082) (0.082)
GDP per capita ratio (host to PHL) -0.018 -0.105
(0.097) (0.098)
Higher Polity Score in PHL -0.364 0.349
(0.579) (0.779)
Ln(total trade) 0.021 -0.049
(0.107) (0.131)
BIT in the past -0.602 -0.302
(0.489) (0.424)
Ideological difference -0.693∗ -0.565∗∗
(0.377) (0.279)
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677
Note: All models estimated with PPML. Standard errors, clustered at the host country and year levels, are in
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table B.16: Log monthly remittances. Panel data model - OLS regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signed BLA in the past -0.309 -0.175 0.015 -0.329 -0.172
(0.548) (0.544) (0.531) (0.569) (0.551)
Ln(GDP per capita of host) 3.411∗∗∗ -0.333
(1.248) (1.535)
Ln(population of host) 2.185 6.675
(3.238) (4.712)
Polity2 of host -0.041 -0.054
(0.060) (0.062)
GDP per capita ratio (host to PHL) 0.813∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.316)
Higher Polity Score in PHL -0.410 -0.591
(0.723) (0.773)
Ln(total trade) 0.135 0.100
(0.089) (0.091)
BIT in the past 1.775∗∗ 1.568∗∗
(0.754) (0.694)
Ideological difference 0.467 0.624
(0.399) (0.388)
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 36972 36972 36972 36972 36972
R2 0.837 0.838 0.840 0.838 0.841
Note: All models estimated with OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the host country and year × month level, are in
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10% ** 5% *** 1%.
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Table B.17: Monthly remittances in levels. Panel data model - PPML Regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signed BLA in the past 0.218 0.191 0.199 0.142 0.114
(0.310) (0.313) (0.327) (0.323) (0.312)
Ln(GDP per capita of host) 0.337 4.417∗
(0.794) (2.321)
Ln(population of host) 0.101 -0.518
(0.728) (0.802)
Polity2 of host -0.169∗∗ -0.161∗∗
(0.078) (0.073)
GDP per capita ratio (host to PHL) -0.028 -0.339∗∗
(0.042) (0.154)
Higher Polity Score in PHL -1.566∗∗∗ -2.417∗∗∗
(0.598) (0.702)
Ln(total trade) -0.087 -0.140
(0.121) (0.144)
BIT in the past -0.488 -0.666
(0.510) (0.503)
Ideological difference 0.407∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.131)
Host country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 36912 36912 36912 36912 36912
Note: All models estimated with PPML. Standard errors, clustered at the host country and year × month level, are





Figure C.1: Effect of the foreign-born share on natives’ aggregate supply of communication tasks
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Figure C.2: Effect of the foreign-born share on natives’ aggregate supply of manual tasks across
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Table C.1: Statistics from first stage regressions: IV80.































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: F-tests of excluded instruments (Angrist and Pischke, 2009)
Foreign-born share 415.34 47.97 52.63 26.16 67.45 24.70 794.38
Foreign-born type 28.79 24.07 42.78 42.51 20.36 79.11
Foreign-born share×type 60.24 75.88 22.78 119.59 43.20 1187.76
Panel B: Kleibergen-Paap test statistic
415.34 33.42 26.19 51.56 49.10 44.04 93.40
Notes. First-stage regressions in table 3.4. The instrumented endogenous variables are indicated in the first column.
The foreign-born type is indicated in the top row in models (2)-(7).
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Figure C.3: Effect of the foreign-born share on natives’ aggregate supply of communication tasks
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Figure C.4: Effect of the foreign-born share on natives’ aggregate supply of manual tasks across
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Pettersson, T. and Öberg, M. (2020). Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.
Journal of Peace Research, 57(4):597–613.
Plotnikova, E. (2011). Recruiting Foreign Nurses of the UK: The Role of Bilateral Labour
Agreements. PhD Diss., University of Edinburgh.
Pollard, N., Latorre, M., and Sriskandarajah, D. (2008). Floodgates or turnstiles? Post-EU
enlargement migration flows to (and from) the UK. Report, Institute for Public Policy
Research.
Poulsen, L. N. S. (2010). The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political
Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence. In Sauvant, K., editor, Yearbook on International
Investment Law and Policy 2009/2010. Oxford University Press. Oxford University Press.
Poulsen, L. N. S. and Aisbett, E. (2016). Diplomats Want Treaties: Diplomatic Agenda and
Perks in the Investment Regime. Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 7(72-91).
172
Pritchett, L. (2018). Alleviating Global Poverty: Labor Mobility, Direct Assistance, and
Economic Growth. Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 479.
Rees-Jones, A. and Rozema, K. (2019). Price Isn’t Everything: Behavioral Response around
Changes in Sin Taxes. Working Paper.
Rose, A. K. (2004). Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? American
Economic Review, 1(94):98–114.
Rozema, K. and Schanzenbach, M. (2019). Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations
to Predict Police Misconduct. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(2):225–
268.
Ruggles, S., Flood, S., Goeken, R., Grover, J., Meyer, E., Pacas, J., and Sobek,
M. (2020). IPUMS USA: Version 10.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V10.0.
Silva, J. M. C. S. and Tenreyro, S. (2006). The Log of Gravity. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 88(4):641–658.
Simmons, B. A. (2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Poli-
tics. Cambridge University Press.
Sinning, M. G. (2011). Determinants of savings and remittances: empirical evidence from
immigrants to Germany. Review of Economics of the Household, 9(1):45–67.
Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. Journal of Political
Economy, 70(5):80–93.
Stark, O., Helmenstein, C., and Yegorov, Y. (1997). Migrants’ Savings, Purchasing Power
Parity, and the Optimal Duration of Migration. International Tax and Public Finance,
4(3):307–324.
Stock, J. H. and Yogo, M. (2002). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression.
Technical working paper 284, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sumption, M. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2020). Net migration to the UK. Brief-
ing, The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. Available at:
https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Net-
Migration-to-the-UK.pdf. Accessed January 22nd, 2021.
Sundberg, R. and Melander, E. (2013). Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.
Journal of Peace Research, 50(4):523–532.
Sykes, A. O. (2013). International Cooperation on Migration: Theory and Practice. The
University of Chicago Law Review, 80(1):315–340.
Trachtman, J. P. (2009). The International Law of Economic Migration: Toward the Fourth
Freedom. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
173
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (2006). O*NET
11.0 Database. Distributed by: O*NET Resource Center. Available at:
https://www.onetcenter.org/license db.html.
Vargas-Silva, C. (2013). Migration flows of A8 and other EU migrants to and from
the UK. Briefing, The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. Available
at: https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/migration-flows-of-a8-and-other-eu-migrants-to-
and-from-the-uk#. Accessed January 22nd, 2021.
von Stein, J. (2005). Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.
American Political Science Review, 99(4):611–622.
Wickramasekara, P. (2015). Bilateral Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding on
Migration of Low Skilled Workers: A Review. ILO Labor Migration Branch.
World Bank. World Development Indicators. Distributed by: World Bank. Accessed: Decem-
ber 12, 2020. Available at: https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-
indicators.
Yang, D. (2006). Why do migrants return to poor countries? Evidence from Philippine
migrants’ responses to exchange rate shocks. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
88(4):715–735.
Yang, D. (2008). International migration, remittances and household investment: evidence
from Philippine migrants’ exchange rate shocks. The Economic Journal, 118(528):591–630.
174
